The effect of board structure on firm value: a multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data by Black, Bernard & Kim, Woochan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effect of board structure on firm
value: a multiple identification strategies
approach using Korean data
Bernard Black and Woochan Kim
Northwestern University, KDI School of Public Policy and
Management
9. July 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40283/
MPRA Paper No. 40283, posted 27. July 2012 06:38 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968287
 
 
The effect of board structure on firm value: a multiple identification 
strategies approach using Korean data† 
Bernard Blacka,*, Woochan Kimb 
aNorthwestern University, Evanston, USA 
b KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Seoul, Korea 
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming 2011 
ABSTRACT 
Outside directors and audit committees are widely considered to be central elements of good corporate 
governance.  We use a 1999 Korean law as an exogenous shock to assess how board structure affects firm market 
value.  The law mandates 50% outside directors and an audit committee for large public firms, but not smaller 
firms.  We study how this shock affects firm market value, using event study, difference-in-differences, and 
instrumental variable methods, within a regression discontinuity approach.  The legal shock produces large share 
price increases for large firms, relative to mid-sized firms; share prices jump in 1999 when the reforms are 
announced. 
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1. Introduction 
A minimum number of outside directors (perhaps a majority), and an audit committee 
staffed principally or solely by outside directors, are standard corporate governance prescriptions.  
Both are prescribed by law in many countries, and are central components of most “comply or 
explain” corporate governance codes.  Yet convincing empirical strategies that can address the 
likely endogeneity of governance and let us assess how these prescriptions affect firm value are 
often not available. 
The principal advance in this paper is to use a legal shock to governance as a basis for 
identification for a connection between board structure and firm market value, proxied by 
Tobin’s q. In 1999, in response to the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis, Korea adopted 
governance rules, effective partly in 2000 and partly in 2001, which require "large" firms (assets 
greater than 2 trillion won, around $2 billion) to have 50% outside directors, an audit committee 
with an outside chair and at least two-thirds outside members, and an outside director nominating 
committee. Smaller firms must have 25% outside directors. 
Prior papers that seek to address endogeneity include Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2009), 
who use Arellano-Bond “internal” instruments and find no connection between board 
composition and firm performance in the US.  Dahya and McConnell (2007) report that UK 
firms which comply with the voluntary Cadbury Committee recommendation to have at least 
three nonexecutive directors experienced improved performance.  Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a), 
a predecessor to this paper (henceforth BJK), use the same legal shock as we do and find that 
firms subject to these rules have higher Tobin’s q’s than smaller firms. 
BJK use cross-sectional data from 2001. In contrast, we build a panel data set which 
includes board structure data from 1996–2004 and full governance data from 1998–2004, 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968287
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covering almost all public companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE).  We seek to 
identify a change in the market value of large firms, relative to mid-sized firms, both in size (is 
there a jump in Tobin's q at the 2-trillion-won threshold) and in time (does the value of large 
firms jump when the reforms are announced).  We conduct event study and difference-in-
differences (DiD) estimation of the effect of adopting these rules, with large firms as the 
treatment group and mid-sized firms as the control group.  We support the event study and DiD 
analyses with firm fixed effects and instrumental variable (IV) analyses.  We report consistent 
evidence across approaches for a connection between board structure (outside directors and audit 
committees) and firm market value. 
A central empirical challenge is to assess whether large firms rose in value for reasons 
unrelated to the legal shock.  We do so in a number of ways.  First, we use a regression 
discontinuity framework to control for a possible continuous effect of firm size on firm market 
value.  Second, the share prices and Tobin's q's of large firms jump relative to mid-sized firms 
when they should—during the mid-1999 period when the main legislative events occur.  Third, 
we find no near-term changes in large firms' profitability or growth which might explain the 
1999 jump.  Fourth, we conduct event studies in six comparable East Asian countries and find 
no evidence that large firms outperform mid-sized firms there during our event period.  Fifth, 
smaller firms which voluntarily adopt the principal reforms have similar value increases to those 
we observe for large firms. 
The estimated effects are economically important.  In our event study, large firms' share 
prices rise by an average of 15% relative to mid-sized firms over a broad window covering our 
principal events.  Our DiD results suggest a roughly 0.13 increase in ln(Tobin's q) from June 1, 
1999 through the end of 1999 (this period captures the full legislative process).  
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The event study and DiD results cannot tell us how much of the value increase reflects 
each of the reforms.  To assess this question, we study both large and small firms, using firm 
fixed effects.  We find evidence supporting separate value from having (a) 50% outside directors, 
(b) having more than 50% outside directors, and less strongly (c) an audit committee. 
Some limitations of this research:  First, the results may not generalize beyond Korea.  
Second, we cannot assess to what extent large firms' market value gains reflect increases in 
overall firm value (which implies that these firms were out of equilibrium before the reforms), 
versus a transfer of value from insiders to outside investors. In related work (Black, Kim, Jang 
and Park, 2011; henceforth BKJP), we find evidence for both sources.  Large firms opposed the 
reforms, which suggests that firm controllers did not expect net gains for them.  Third, our 
empirical strategy does not let us study how different aspects of board structure affect firm 
market value. 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the related literature and discusses the principal empirical 
challenges.  Section 3 describes our data sources and our governance indices.  Section 4 
presents event study results.  Section 5 presents DiD results.  Section 6 presents firm fixed 
effects results.  Section 7 presents IV results, and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Literature review and empirical issues 
Section 2.1 reviews the principal challenges for empirical research on the valuation 
effects of board structure or corporate governance more generally.  Section 2.2 discusses our 
multiple identification strategies approach. 
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2.1. Empirical challenges 
The literature on boards of directors is large, but most studies lack a sound basis for 
causal inference (often, if imprecisely, called identification).  For a recent review, see Adams, 
Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010).1  Board structure is usually chosen by the firm and thus could 
be endogenous to other firm characteristics (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Lehn, 
Patro, and Zhao, 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2008).  One problem is reverse causation, with firm 
performance influencing board composition.  In developed countries, firms respond to poor 
performance by increasing board independence (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Erickson, Park, 
Reising, and Shin, 2005).  Thus, one cannot infer causation from studies which find an 
association between board independence and firm performance – whether negative (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Yermack, 1996, all studying the US)—or positive (Choi, 
Park and Yoo, 2007(Korea); Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell, 2008 (multicountry); Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005 (Taiwan)).  Optimal governance could also depend on firm characteristics.  
There is evidence that board structure adapts to firm-specific circumstances (see, e.g., Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2001; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; 
Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2006; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2007).2  Several articles contend 
that due to these problems, we know little about how corporate governance affects firm value or 
performance (see, e.g., Chidambaran, Palia, and Zheng, 2006; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao, 2007; 
Listokin, 2007). 
                                            
1 The Korean reforms have two central components—outside directors and audit committees.  We discuss in the 
text the prior research on board composition.  Research on the connection between audit committees and overall 
firm value is limited, and does not offer convincing identification.  Klein (1998) finds a correlation between the 
presence of an audit committee and a variety of accounting and market performance measures.  Vafaes and 
Theodorou (1998) and Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2003) find similar results in the UK. 
2 Similar concerns with this "optimal differences" flavor of endogeneity arise for studies of the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999). 
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Several prior studies address identification, but all have limitations. Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter (2009) (US) find that board independence predicts Tobin’s q with firm fixed effects, but 
significance disappears if they use Arellano-Bond GMM “internal instruments” for board 
independence.  This could, however, reflect the limited power of the Arellano-Bond procedure.  
Dahya and McConnell (2007) find improved operating performance for UK firms which increase 
their number of nonexecutive directors to three to comply with the Cadbury Committee “comply 
or explain” governance recommendation.  However, this study has potential selection bias, both 
in which firms had fewer than three nonexecutive directors prior to the Cadbury report, and 
which firms chose to comply after the report was issued.3  Black and Khanna (2007) use an 
event study of a broad Indian corporate governance reform, which emphasizes but is not limited 
to board independence and audit committees.  BJK is the most similar to this article and use the 
same legal shock, but have only cross-sectional data in 2001; thus the main empirical strategies 
used here, which focus on the time of the shock, are not available. 
2.2. Multiple causal inference strategies approach 
This paper builds on BJK.  We seek to address the principal limitations of BJK and 
strengthen the evidence for a causal connection between the 1999 reforms and the market values 
of large Korean firms.4  We extend the BJK data, which is from mid-2001, back to 1996 and 
forward to 2004, thus covering the period before, during, and after the 1999 reforms and the 
                                            
3 Arcot and Bruno (2007) and MacNeil and Li (2006) report that well-performing UK firms are more likely to 
explain rather than fully comply with the current UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance, a successor to the 
Cadbury Code. 
4 In our view, the most important limitations of BJK, addressed here, are:  (i) large-firm share prices could be 
higher than small-firm prices for a non-governance reason, that is merely associated with the large-firm instrument 
used there in an IV analysis; (ii) investors' initial enthusiasm for the reforms, observed in 2001 just after the reforms 
came into effect, might fade after investors gain experience with the reforms; (iii) BJK are agnostic on whether their 
instrument is best seen as instrumenting for governance generally, or only for board structure. 
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2000–2001 effective dates of those reforms.  We then use event study and DiD analyses to 
estimate the effect of the reforms on firm market value in time (when the reforms were adopted) 
as well as in size.  We confirm that large firms in other similar East Asian countries did not 
experience a similar price rise at the same time as large Korean firms, that the value effect of the 
reforms persists through the end of 2004, and that voluntary board changes by small firms 
produce similar price effects to the large firm reforms.  We search for, and do not find, evidence 
to support a non-governance explanation for the mid-1999 jump in large firm prices.  IV 
analysis provides a robustness check on the DiD results. We use a regression discontinuity 
approach (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), in which we control 
for a smooth effect of firm size on firm market value, and also limit the size range for control and 
treatment firms, to the extent our sample size permits.  We find consistent results across 
approaches.5 
We cannot assess here whether the shock-related increase in large firms' market values 
reflects an initial out-of-equilibrium position, in which the legal shock improves firm efficiency; 
wealth transfer from insiders to outsiders (which would increase market value but not 
unobserved total value); or both.  In a companion paper, BKJP find evidence for both broad 
channels.  The existence of plausible channels through which board structure could affect firms' 
market values further supports a causal link between board structure and firm market value.6 
                                            
5 Our identification strategy complements an alternate means of addressing endogeneity, by developing a structural 
model.  Examples include Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2007) for managerial ownership; Harris and Raviv (2008) 
for board structure; and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2002) for investor protection rules. 
6 It may help some readers to provide an overview of our papers on Korean governance.  BJK (2006a) is an initial 
identification paper, using cross-sectional data from 2001.  Black, Jang, and Kim (2006b) examine what predicts 
firms’ governance choices.  This paper extends BJK by providing stronger causal inference using panel data.  
BKJP examine the channels through which governance may affect firm market value or performance. 
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3. Data and governance index construction 
3.1. Event dates 
Prior to 1998, few Korean firms had outside directors and almost none had 50% outside 
directors, except for a few banks and majority state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  Corporate law 
did not permit an audit committee or other board committees.  Following the 1997–1998 East 
Asian financial crisis, Korean firms elected more outside directors and introduced other 
governance reforms, partly voluntarily and partly due to legal changes. Legal reforms in 1998 
required all public firms to have at least 25% outside directors.  The corporate law was 
amended in 1999 to permit board committees.  The large-firm rules we focus on here (50% 
outside directors, audit committee, and outside director nominating committee) were adopted in 
1999, with the principal legislative event dates in June-August, legislative action in December, 
and the rules coming into force at firms’ annual shareholder meetings in spring 2000 (audit 
committee and outside director nominating committee) and 2001 (50% outside directors).7 
We search Korean newspapers for news announcements related to the 1999 legal reforms, 
and extract four potential event dates, summarized in Table 1.8  Announcements on June 2–3, 
1999 (event 1) indicated that the government would amend Korea's corporate governance rules, 
focusing on chaebol reform.  Prior news stories made it clear that the reforms would focus on 
audit committees and on outside directors.  A June 25, 1999 announcement provides detail, but 
nothing significantly new, so we omit this date in the analysis below.  On July 2, 1999, the 
government announced that the rules would apply to “large” firms (rather than chaebol firms as 
                                            
7 Large firms were required to have at least three outside directors by their 2000 meeting.  This was primarily a 
transition rule, but also acted as a minimum board size requirement:  A firm which wanted exactly 50% outside 
directors needed to have at least six directors. 
8 A more complete list of events is available from the authors on request. 
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such) but did not specify a size threshold (event 2).  The first specification of the size threshold 
came on August 25, 1999, when the Ministry of Finance circulated a draft law which specified a 
1 trillion won threshold, and required large firms to have 50% outside directors and an audit 
committee with at least two-thirds outside directors (event 3).  There were conflicting 
announcements over whether the size threshold would be raised to 2 trillion won during Sept. 
21–29; the threshold was stated at 2 trillion won on October 20, but this was likely anticipated 
due to the prior announcements.  Legislative action was unlikely to be significant.  There was 
little doubt that the legislature would adopt the government's proposal and it did so, without 
significant change, a few weeks after the government bill was introduced. 
Given this history, we must decide which firms belong to the treatment group for each 
event.  The government's early public statements stressed chaebol reform, rather than large-firm 
reform, so we treat chaebol firms as the treatment group for event 1.  Event 2 included the first 
statement that the reforms threshold would be size-based, but the size threshold was not stated.  
The size threshold was first stated as 1 trillion won in August (event 3).  The reforms were 
developed by a public-private Corporate Governance Reform Committee, which surely consulted 
informally with major Korean firms.  Thus, market participants likely had a rough sense for the 
likely size threshold before it was announced.  For events 2 and 3, we use 1 trillion won in 
assets at year-end 1998 as the dividing line between treatment and control firms.  By the time of 
legislative adoption, the threshold was raised to 2 trillion won.  We therefore use a 2 trillion 
won threshold for our DiD and IV results, for which the “after” date is December 1999, after the 
reforms are complete.  We refer to over-1-trillion (2-trillion) won firms as "large-plus" (large) 
firms. 
The Federation of Korean Industry (FKI), the principal chaebol trade group, opposed the 
  - 10 - 
reforms.9  The chaebol were able to get the threshold raised to 2 trillion won and delay full 
implementation until 2001, but could not block the reforms. The government also announced 
some less significant reforms, limited to chaebol firms, during August 1999.  We confirm in 
horserace regressions that a large-plus dummy is significant, and a chaebol dummy is not, for 
event periods that include these announcements.10 
3.2. Sample, governance index, and variables 
We study Korean companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange, excluding banks and 
SOEs (our sample would otherwise include 14 banks and six SOEs).  We determine board 
composition at six-month intervals from 1998–2004, relying on books published annually by the 
Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA). 
To limit omitted variable bias, we want to control for other attributes of firm governance, 
which often correlate with board structure and could separately predict firm market value.  We 
rely on a Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) from 1998–2004, developed and described 
in BKJP, and summarized in Table 2.  Observations of KCGI are at year-end, except for 2001, 
when we also have mid-year data.  KCGI (0 ~ 100) consists of five equally weighted indices: 
Board Structure; Board Procedure; Shareholder Rights; Disclosure; and Ownership Parity. 
Board Structure index is composed of Board Independence subindex (2 elements, 0 ~ 10), 
and Board Committee subindex (3 elements, 0 ~ 10), defined as: 
Board Independence subindex = 10*(b1 + b2)/2: 
                                            
9 See, for example, Ikwon Lee, FKI asks government to repeal outside director ratio, Korean Economic Daily (Sept. 
7, 1999). 
10 We are not aware of other regulatory changes during this period that differentially affected large and small firms. 
Dewenter, Kim, Lim, and Novaes (2006) discuss changes in Korean stock exchange listing rules during 1999–2002.  
The only relevant change in 1999 simply requires firms to comply with the new legal rules. 
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b1 = 1 if firm has 50% outside directors; 0 otherwise; 
b2 = 1 if firm has > 50% outside directors; 0 otherwise. 
Board Committee subindex = 10*(b3 + b4 + b5)/3: 
b3 = 1 if firm has outside director nominating committee, 0 otherwise; 
b4 = 1 if firm has audit director committee, 0 otherwise; 
b5 = 1 if firm has compensation committee, 0 otherwise.  
The 1999 law requires large firms to have elements b1, b3, and b4.  For a firm which previously 
had none of these elements, Board Structure Index will rise from zero to 11.67, out of 20 
possible points. The large-firm mean in fact rises from 0.20 in 1998 (one large firm had 50% 
outside directors, none had audit or other committees) to 12.47 in spring 2001.  Figure 1 shows 
the mean Board Independence and Board Committee subindex values over time for balanced 
panels of large and small Korean public firms, respectively. 
We use an extensive set of control variables, listed in Table 7, to further limit omitted 
variable bias.  Data come from various sources.  Financial data, foreign ownership, and listing 
year is from the KLCA’s TS2000 database; information on chaebol firms is from annual press 
releases by the Korean Fair Trade Commission; stock market data are from the KSE; American 
Depository Receipt (ADR) data are from JP Morgan and Citibank websites; and industry 
classifications are the Korea Statistics Office.  Table 3, Panel A defines the principal variables 
we study in this paper; Panel B provides summary statistics for these variables. 
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4.  Event study 
If the 1999 rules for large-firm governance affect market value, investors anticipate this 
effect when the legislation is proposed, and key legislative dates can be determined; an event 
study can help to identify a causal impact of the reforms on market value. 
4.1. Event study methodology 
We use two principal event study methods.  First, we use a regression approach to 
estimate the returns to treatment group firms, relative to a control group, over each event period.  
Recall from Section 3.1 that the treatment group is chaebol firms for event 1, and large-plus 
firms (assets greater than 1 trillion won) for events 2 and 3.  Consider events 2 and 3 first.  
Ideally, to strengthen causal inference, one would want the treatment (control) group to include 
only firms just above (below) the size threshold.  This reduces the risk that firm size, rather than 
governance reforms, explains our results.  But narrow bands limit the number of sample firms, 
thus reducing statistical power and raising the risk of a spurious result driven by non-governance 
returns to a modest number of treated firms.  We address these competing concerns by using 
mid-sized firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won (n = 47) as the control group; and two 
alternate treatment groups:  a “main” treatment group of firms with assets from 1–4 trillion won 
(n = 54), and a “narrow” group with assets from 1–1.5 trillion won (n = 18). 
For event 1, the distinction between treatment and control groups is not size-based, but 
most chaebol are large. 11   We again exclude small firms from the sample entirely, as not 
comparable to the treatment group.  We also exclude very large chaebol firms (assets greater 
than 8 trillion won) because there are no very large non-chaebol firms.  Thus, the control group 
                                            
11 Of 78 firms with assets greater than 1 trillion won, 57 are chaebol firms. 
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is non-chaebol with assets from 0.5 to 8 trillion, and the treatment group is chaebol in this size 
range.12 
We compute cumulative market adjusted returns (CMARs) to the treatment firms during 
the event period, relative to a "Mid-sized index"—an equally weighted index of control group 
returns. The CMARs are the sum of daily market-adjusted returns over the event period.  Size is 
measured at year-end 1998.We regress the CMARs on a treatment group dummy variable and 
control variables of interest.  A typical regression is: 
+* ( * )i j j itreatment
j
CMAR D X         (1) 
Here, Dtreatment is the treatment group dummy and Xj is a vector of control variables.  The 
coefficient  captures the predicted CMAR for treatment group firms over the event period. 
The event period is common to all firms in our sample.  This makes it likely that 
individual firm returns violate the usual regression assumption of independent observations.  
Firms in the same industry could move together, or large-plus (small) firms could move with 
other large-plus (small) firms.  We therefore compute standard errors using industry-group 
clusters, with industries based on four-digit Korea industry codes.  We return to the problem of 
cross-sectional correlation of returns below. We drop outlier observations for which a studentized 
residual obtained by regressing the dependent variable (CMAR or CAR) on chaebol dummy (for 
                                            
12 In robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we expand the sample for event 1 to go down to 0.25 trillion 
won or narrow it to go up only to 4 trillion won.    In an unreported “horserace” regression with separate chaebol 
and large-plus (assets greater than 1 trillion won) dummies, similar to Table 4, Panel A, regression (2), the 
coefficient on chaebol dummy is positive and significant (0.0382, t = 2.65); while the coefficient on large-plus 
dummy is small and insignificant (-0.0028, t = 0.16).  We further confirm that investors saw event 1 as about 
chaebol reform by studying smaller firms (assets less than 1 trillion won).  Small chaebol firms earn abnormal 
returns relative to non-chaebol firms for event 1 (coefficient on chaebol dummy = 0.0299, t = 3.38) in a regression 
similar to Table 4, Panel A, regression (2). 
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event 1) or large-plus firm dummy (for other events) is greater than ±1.96.  These returns likely 
reflect firm-specific events rather than governance rules. 
Our second event study approach uses a standard event study of abnormal returns over 
each event period (Brown and Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997).  For each firm, we compute 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on the market model, using the Mid-sized index as 
the market index. We estimate the market model during January–May and September–December, 
1999.  We exclude the June–August 1999 event period. 
4.2. Graphical overview of event study results 
Figure 2 provides a graphical overview of returns to an equally weighted index of large-
plus versus a similar index of mid-sized firms during 1999.  Each index is set to 100 at year-end 
1998.  The two indices move together through 1998 and the first five months of 1999.  They 
diverge, beginning in June, around the time of event 1, and remain separated thereafter.  This is 
consistent with our story:  Large-plus firms gain relative to mid-sized firms when they should, if 
governance changes are driving share price changes.  The divergence is not related to overall 
market movements.  There is little divergence in late 1998 and early 1999, when prices rise 
strongly.  The divergence appears instead during a period when an equally weighted index of all 
firms' share prices (dominated by smaller firms) is slightly declining. 
Figure 3 narrows the time period and shows the cumulative difference between the large-
plus and mid-sized indices from April 30, 1999 (roughly one month before event 1) to the end of 
1999. Each index is renormalized to 100 at April 30, 1999.  There is an overall rise, consistent 
with gradual release of information, or gradual investor assessment of the implications of the 
governance reform, during June-August, covering the period from event 1 through event 3, and 
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no significant trend thereafter.  If one focuses more narrowly on the event dates, which are 
shown with vertical lines in the figure, there is a rise prior to event 1, consistent with potential 
leakage of information (though we interpret event 1 as being about chaebol firms, rather than 
large-plus firms as such), and a rise around events 2 and 3. 
4.3. CMAR regression results 
Table 4, Panel A reports regression results for market-adjusted returns. We report results 
for a (-2,+3) window around each event, and also for two long windows, one window covering 
the period from day -2 preceding event 2 through day +3 for event 3, and one which goes from 
day -2 preceding event 1 through day +3 for event 3.13  Regression sets (1)–(3) use our “main” 
treatment group (assets from 1-4 trillion won).  In regression set (1), the short window returns 
for each event are positive, economically meaningful, and statistically significant, for chaebol 
firms relative to non-chaebol firms for event 1, and for large-plus firms relative to mid-sized 
firms for events 2 and 3 and the long windows.  The cumulative return over events 2–3 is 13.69% 
(t = 3.16).  These results are consistent with investors reacting positively to the large-firm rules. 
A central issue for this paper is whether we are observing a size-based effect, which is 
correlated with but unrelated to the regulatory threshold.  We address this question in several 
ways.  First, the narrower the event window, the less likely is this alternate explanation.  Yet 
we obtain positive returns over narrow event windows around all three events.  Second, we 
search for and do not find news announcements during the event period, or during the rest of 
1999, suggesting that economic times are unusually good for large firms or chaebol firms. 
                                            
13 In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results for narrower (-1,+2) windows around each event, for 
other intermediate windows, and for long windows which begin earlier than day -2 before event 1, or end later than 
day +3 following event 3. 
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Third, in regression set (2) we control for a smooth parametric effect of firm size on 
Tobin’s q, by adding ln(market capitalization) as a control variable.  For the size-based events, 
the returns to large-plus firms are somewhat larger with this control; t-statistics also increase 
despite some loss of statistical power due to the 0.48 correlation between large-plus dummy and 
ln(market cap).  In regression set (3), we address the possibility that the relation between event 
period returns and firm size might not be captured by a simple ln(market cap) specification, by 
including the first six powers of ln(market cap) as additional independent variables, to provide a 
flexible form for this relation.14  Large-plus dummy remains positive and significant for the 
size-based events, and t-statistics again increase for the size-based windows.  For the events 2–3 
long window, the estimated gain for large-plus firms is 15.8% (t = 3.34) with the full six-powers 
control.  Here and in later tables, we obtain similar results in robustness checks with other 
polynomial forms for our firm size control. 
Fourth, in regression set (4), we obtain similar results for size-based events (events 2 and 
3 and long windows including these events) with the “narrow” treatment group, limited to assets 
from 1–1.5 trillion won.  Set (4) is otherwise similar to set (2), and controls for ln(market cap).  
For event 3—the first time the government specified the size threshold at 1 trillion won—share 
prices for large-plus firms jump by 6.4% (t = 4.64), relative to mid-sized firms.  Large-plus 
dummy is also economically large and statistically significant for longer windows including 
event3.  For event 2, the return to large-plus firms is positive but not significant; insignificance 
is not surprising since the treatment group includes only 18 firms and this announcement did not 
specify a size threshold.  The coefficient for event 2 becomes significant (coefficient = 4.1%, t 
= 2.09) if we expand the treatment group to cover firms with assets from 1–2 trillion won (n = 
                                            
14  The 6-powers functional form was originally suggested by Steven Levitt in comments on BJK. In unreported 
robustness checks for this and other tables, we obtain similar results with other polynomial forms. 
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31). 
The coefficients in regression sets (2) and (4) for windows including event 3 are virtually 
the same.  The t-statistics are lower for the narrower group, as expected due to the smaller 
number of treatment group firms.  Thus, the jump at the threshold remains roughly constant as 
one approaches the discontinuity.  This supports a causal interpretation (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008).15 
The final regression in each set is a “horserace” regression with two treatment groups:  
chaebol firms and large-plus, non-chaebol firms; the control group is mid-sized non-chaebol 
firms.  This tests our interpretation of event 2 and 3 as being principally about large firm reform, 
rather than chaebol reform.  Chaebol dummy is positive but insignificant in all sets; large-plus 
dummy is similar in size to the event 2-3 regression without chaebol dummy, and is significant 
with a firm size control (sets (2)-(4)) and marginally significant without this control.  For the 
narrow treatment group, large-plus dummy takes a 0.18 coefficient (t = 2.32), while chaebol 
dummy takes a small .01.  This is consistent with our interpretation of events 2 and 3. 
In Figure 4, we return to graphical depiction.  The left-hand figure shows a scatter plot 
of CMARs over the events 1-3 window, for firms with assets from 0.5–4 trillion won, a vertical 
line at 1 trillion won, and horizontal lines on either side of the vertical line.  The line to the left 
of the vertical line shows mean returns to control firms (= 0 by definition).  The longer line on 
the right shows the mean return to the main treatment group; the shorter line shows the mean 
return for the narrow treatment group.  The right-hand figure is similar, for a window covering 
events 2–3.  Each figure shows an economically and statistically significant jump for the main 
                                            
15 In robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we include firms with assets from 0.25–0.5 trillion in the control 
group, use alternate size bands for the treatment group, including 1–2 trillion won, 1–8 trillion won, or 2–4 trillion 
won (using the later-chosen threshold of 2 trillion won as the lower bound). 
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treatment group at the threshold (equivalent to Table 4, Panel A, regression set (1)), and a similar, 
marginally significant jump for the narrow treatment group.  The jump for the narrow group 
becomes significant if we control for ln(market cap) or use CARs instead of CMARs. 
4.4. CAR (event study) results 
In Table 4, Panel B, we switch to a classic event study methodology, and do not exclude 
outliers.  The index is non-chaebol firms for event 1 and mid-sized firms for other events.  We 
report results based on two sets of firm groupings:  First, we use industry portfolios.  This 
allows for cross-sectional correlation within industry, but assumes independence across 
industries (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985).  These results are the most comparable with Panel 
A, where we use industry-group clusters to address intra-industry and intra-group correlations.  
The CAR results are consistent with the CMAR results.  Using the main treatment group, the 
CAR for combined event 2–3 CAR is 14.3% (z = 4.78).  For individual events, the CARs are 
positive and significant for events 1 and 2, and become so for event 3 if we exclude the outliers 
from the CMAR analysis, or include firms with assets from 0.25–0.5 trillion won in the control 
group.  In regression set 3, which uses the narrow treatment group, the results are significant for 
all windows. 
A further response to the risk of cross-sectional correlation in returns is to combine all 
treatment group firms into a single, equally weighted portfolio.  This fully controls for cross-
sectional dependence at the cost of lower statistical power.  We implement this approach in the 
second set of results in Panel B. The z-statistics generally weaken, as expected, but remain 
reasonably strong.  All events that were significant with industry portfolios remain significant, 
for both the main and narrow treatment groups.  For the main treatment group, the CAR for 
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event 3 increases to 3.7% and is marginally significant (z = 1.69).16 
We apply a battery of robustness checks to our results, in addition to those described 
above.  We obtain similar results if we:  (i) use log returns instead of fractional returns, (ii) use 
"jump" (buy-and-hold) returns for the entire window instead of summing daily returns; (iii) vary 
the estimation period for the CAR results;17 (iv) do not exclude outliers in the CMAR results, 
exclude them for the CAR results, or winsorize returns at 1%/99% instead of excluding outliers; 
and (viii) add the firm-level control variables used in Table 7 (other than ln(assets), which we 
omit since we control for ln(market cap)).  As is expected when returns are positive over a 
period of time, the long-window buy-and-hold returns exceed the CMAR or CAR returns.  For 
example, in the buy-and-hold equivalent of Panel A, regression set 2, the predicted return to 
large-plus firms over the event 2–3 window is 0.1547% (t = 2.79). 
4.5. Comparison to other East Asian countries 
If June-August 1999 was a good period for large Korean firms, for reasons unrelated to 
governance, it may have been good for large firms in similar countries.  We therefore study the 
returns to large firms in six other East Asian countries:  Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  We conduct an event study of the daily returns to large 
public firms in these six countries over 1999 (n = 428), using different size thresholds, including 
the large plus threshold (local currency equivalent of 1 trillion won) and the large-firm threshold 
                                            
16 In unreported regressions, firm-level CARs are similar to the industry results; the t-statistics are larger, as 
expected. On the choice between industry portfolios and a single treatment group portfolio, industry portfolios are 
often a reasonable compromise between test power and the potential for cross-sectional correlation to produce 
biased standard errors.  Brown and Warner (1985, p. 22) suggest that there can be "gains from procedures assuming 
independence [across industries] . . . even when . . . all [firms] have the same event date."  Bernard (1987, p. 11 and 
Table 1) concurs with Brown and Warner that intraindustry correlation can be important but finds that "interindustry 
cross-sectional correlation is small relative to intraindustry correlation." 
17Standard errors increase if we extend the estimation period back earlier than September 1998, due to three outlier 
returns during August and September 1998, related to the East Asian financial crisis. 
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(2 trillion won), relative to an index of mid-sized firms (0.25–1 trillion won).  There is no 
evidence of positive returns to large firms.  Figure 5 shows results for a pooled sample of all six 
countries, for large-plus relative to mid-sized firms.  The two groups move together.  In a 
pooled regression similar to Table 4, regression set (1), the returns to large-plus firms over the 
long window covering events 1–3 is close to zero (coefficient = 0.0051; t = 0.24).18 
We obtain similar non-results for individual countries.  In regressions similar to Table 4, 
Panel A, regression set (1), the returns to large-plus firms over the events 1–3 window are 
insignificant for four countries, positive for Taiwan, and negative for Indonesia.  Over the 
events 2–3 window, the returns are insignificant for four countries, positive for Singapore, and 
negative for Thailand.  For none of the countries are the returns significant for both of these 
windows.  The positive returns for Taiwan over the 1–3 window and for Singapore over the 2–3 
window change sign and become insignificant if we control for ln(market cap), similar to 
regression set (2).  Thus, there is no evidence of gains for large firms relative to mid-sized firms 
in these other countries, and no evidence of a break in returns around the large-plus threshold. 
5.  Difference-in-differences analysis 
Difference-in-differences analysis offers an alternative way to assess whether the 
governance reforms predict a value increase for large firms, at the right time (when the reforms 
are adopted).  If investors assign higher value to firms with 50% outside directors and an audit 
committee, then the Tobin's q's of large firms should rise, relative to mid-sized firms, between 
May 1999 (just before the legislative reforms began) and the end of 1999, when the legal rules 
requiring these governance elements are adopted, controlling for other factors that affect Tobin's 
                                            
18 The pooled regression includes country fixed effects and industry-country-group clusters. 
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q.  One has no reason to expect similar relative gains for large firms at other times.  DiD 
analysis, extended for a period after the reforms take effect, can also let us assess whether 
investors’ initial views persist or fade, once they see the reforms’ actual results. 
5.1. DiD methodology 
We again exclude small firms from the sample.  Our control group is mid-sized firms 
with assets from 0.5–2 trillion won at May 1999 (t = 0).  We use large firms with assets from 2–
8 trillion won at year-end 1999 (n = 39) as the main treatment group, and large firms with assets 
from 2–4 trillion won (n = 19) as the narrow treatment group.19  We compute Tobin's q at six-
month intervals from June 30, 1996, through Dec. 31, 2004, except that June 30, 1999 lies in the 
middle of the legal reform period, so we move the measurement date back to May 31, 1999, 
which precedes the reforms.20  We use Tobin's q as our principal measure of firm value, but 
obtain similar results for market/book. 
We take logs of Tobin's q (or market/book) to address skewness in non-logged values.  
We also drop outliers for each year if a studentized residual, obtained from a regression of 
ln(Tobin’s q) (or ln(market/book)) on large-firm dummy is greater than ±1.96.21  Equation (2) 
provides our main DiD specification.  All regressions use robust standard errors. 
                                            
19 We exclude from the treatment group one firm that alre ady had 50% outside directors at May 1999.  In 
robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we drop firms from the control group if they voluntarily adopt 50% 
outside directors.  The logic behind this specification is as follows.  We find evidence below that small firms who 
voluntarily adopt the reforms experience similar price increases to large firms; thus, including the voluntary adopters 
in the control group could bias against finding an effect of the reforms.  
20 We use six-month periods because we have financial data available every six months.  In robustness checks, we 
obtain similar results if we measure firm size at year-end 1998 or year-end 1999.  To measure firm size, Tobin’s q, 
and market/book at May 31, 1999, we interpolate between December 1998 and June 1999. 
21 In robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we do not exclude outliers, do not take logs, or both (though 
weaker for non-logged market/book, which has some extreme outlier firms with low book values of equity). 
  - 22 - 
-0 , 0 , , , 0 ,[ln(Tobin's ) ] ln( )i i i t j i j i
j
q L assets X                   (2) 
Here τ is a date from June 1996 through Dec. 1994 (other than the base date of May 1999), the 
dependent variable is the change in ln(Tobin’s q) from time 0 to time τ; Li is a large-firm dummy 
variable (= 1 if firm i is large at both date 0 and date τ, 0 otherwise); and X is a vector of control 
variables.  Since we difference our dependent variable, we also difference the control variables.  
The exception is ln(assets), which captures a potential direct influence of firm size on the change 
in Tobin’s q, which might otherwise be captured by large-firm dummy. 
For each date τ, the constant ατ gives the predicted change in ln(Tobin’s q) for mid-sized 
firms from date 0 to τ.  The coefficient of interest is λτ, which gives the predicted additional 
change in ln(Tobin’s q) over this period for large firms.  If the governance reforms positively 
affected Tobin's q, these coefficients should be positive beginning in December 1999, but 
insignificant before that.  Also, if large firms and small firms otherwise generally move together, 
there should not be large jumps in λτ between adjacent time periods, except at December 1999. 
5.2. DiD main results 
We begin in Figure 6 with a graphical presentation.  Figure 6A shows, for the main 
treatment group, the λτ coefficients from a simple regression of Δ(ln(Tobin’s q)) on a constant 
term and large-firm dummy, for December 1997 through December 2001, together with dotted 
lines showing 5%–95% confidence bounds around these point estimates.  The estimates are 
small and insignificant prior to May 1999, zero by construction for May 1999, jump in 
December 1999, and remain positive, statistically significant, and roughly flat thereafter.  An 
extended graph covering the full period from June 1996 through December 2004 would be 
similar.  The December 1999 point estimate is 0.130 (t = 2.51).  For a large firm with median 
  - 23 - 
Tobin's q (0.97) and leverage (0.68), this increase in ln(Tobin's q) implies a 46% increase in 
share price.22  These results are consistent with investors revaluing large firms relative to mid-
sized firms at the time of the reforms, and not at other times.  The lack of significant movement 
after 1999 is consistent with investors retaining their initial beliefs about the value of the 
governance reforms, and not making large reassessments of their value, in either direction.23 
Figure 6B uses the narrow treatment group (2–4 trillion won).  Standard errors increase, 
as expected due to smaller sample size.  The point estimate for December 1999 increases to 
0.168 (t = 2.31).  Overall, point estimates are similar for both treatment groups.  These figures 
visually support the view that something happened to large firms during the treatment window of 
May-December 1999.  Changes in Tobin’s q for large and mid-sized firms are similar at other 
times. 
In Table 5, we turn to regression analysis and focus on the core treatment period from 
May to December 1999.  Panel A shows results for Tobin’s q.  Odd- (even)-numbered 
regressions use the main (narrow) treatment group.  Regression (1) is equivalent to the 
December 1999 estimate in Figure 6A.  Regression (2) is similar to regression (1), but uses the 
narrow treatment group.  The coefficient on large-firm dummy is 0.13 (0.17) for the main 
(narrow) treatment group and is significant for both groups. 
                                            
22 Tobin’s q = (debt/assets) + (market value of equity/assets).  A shock to share price affects only the second term:  
Let T be the fractional increase in Tobin's q and S be the fractional share price increase.  S = [New (market 
equity/assets)]/[Old (market equity/assets)] – 1 = [New q – (debt/assets)]/[Old q – (debt /assets)] – 1 = [(Old 
q)*(1+T) – (debt/assets)]/[Old q – (debt /assets)] – 1.  This equation can be solved for S if we know debt/assets, old 
q, and the fractional change T. 
23 The insignificant results prior to the base date do not support one competing explanation for our results—large 
firms suffered more than small firms in the East Asian financial crisis, which was concentrated in the second half of 
1997 and the first half of 1998, and then rebounded with a lag in the second half of 1999. 
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In regressions (3)–(6), we implement the regression discontinuity approach, by adding 
ln(assets) as a control variable.24  In regressions (3)–(4), we control for ln(assets).  This has 
only a minor effect on the coefficient on large-firm dummy.  This coefficient is about 0.15 and 
marginally significant for both groups.  The lower significance level likely reflects colinearity 
between large-firm dummy and ln(assets); the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.76 (0.84) for 
the main (narrow) treatment group (see last row of Panel A).  In regressions (5)–(6), we address 
this colinearity issue by expanding the control group to include all small firms.  The correlation 
coefficient drops, as expected, and large-firm dummy is again statistically significant. 
In regressions (7)–(8), we again limit the control group to mid-sized firms (0.5–2 trillion 
won), and add controls for first differences in the first six powers of ln(assets).  The coefficient 
on large-firm dummy rises to 0.17 (0.18) for the main (narrow) treatment group.  the t-statistics 
drop, similar to regressions (3)–(4); we retain marginal significance for the narrow treatment 
group and barely lose it for the main treatment group.  Finally, in regressions (9)–(10), we add a 
battery of first differences in control variables, and also expand the control group slightly to 
extend down to 0.25 trillion won.  The coefficients on large-firm dummy are 0.12 (0.17) for the 
main (narrow) treatment group and are statistically significant.25  In robustness checks, we vary 
control variables, treatment group range, and control group range.  The coefficients on large-
firm dummy are consistently within the 0.12–0.19 range shown in Panel A.  They are also 
usually, as in Panel A, somewhat larger if we use the narrow treatment group or more extensive 
                                            
24 In our event study, we used ln(market cap) as a size measure.  In the DiD analysis, we use Tobin's q as 
dependent variable and ln(assets) as the size control.  We need a different size control, because Tobin's q is a scaled 
version of market capitalization.  In robustness checks, we obtain similar results with ln(sales) as a size measure.  
We measure ln(assets) at May 1999.  We have semiannual data for assets, and interpolate between December 1998 
and June 1999 to estimate ln(assets) at May 1999. 
25 For control variables other than ln(assets), we have only annual data, so the first differences are from December 
1999 to December 1998. 
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controls; are statistically significant except when we use both extensive controls and a narrow 
control group; and are marginally significant, or nearly so, throughout.26 
In Panel B, we use market/book as a dependent variable, with consistent results.  
Ln(Market/book) is economically large in all regressions, with both the main and narrow 
treatment groups.  It is significant or marginally significant in all regressions except regressions 
(9)–(10), where we use a limited control group, thus creating strong colinearity between large-
firm dummy and ln(assets), and extensive controls.  We can recover significance in these 
regressions by using a broader group of control firms. 
In both panels, the coefficient on ln(assets) is small, always insignificant, and of varying 
sign.  Thus, there is no evidence of a smooth size effect on firm market value, separate from the 
discontinuous effect at the treatment threshold. 
The treatment time period in our DiD analysis is common to all large firms, which could 
lead to cross-sectional correlation in the treatment effects.  Thus, customary DiD standard errors 
could be biased downward. In the event study, we addressed cross-sectional correlation by 
studying returns to a portfolio of all large firms.  For the DiD analysis, we use a bootstrap 
approach.  We compute the coefficient on large-firm dummy for all seven-month periods 
between June 1996 to December 2004, excluding the treatment period (May-December 1999).  
This provides 81 DiD coefficients for partly overlapping periods. For the main treatment group, 
none equal or exceed the 0.130 coefficient in Table 5, regression (1); the largest is 0.107.  For 
the narrow treatment group, the largest bootstrap coefficient is 0.102, well below the 0.168 
                                            
26 In unreported results, we assess “covariate balance”—do control variables take on similar values for large and 
mid-sized firms?  For the narrow treatment group, levels are statistically different (at the 5% level) only for R&D 
(higher for treatment firms) and sole ownership (lower for treatment firms).  The DiD regression design should 
control for the effect of differences in levels on Tobin’s q, unless that effect changes at the time of the 1999 reforms, 
which we have no reason to expect.  First differences (December 1999 minus May 1999) are statistically different 
only for leverage (larger decline for treatment group), and only for the median, not the mean. 
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coefficient in Table 5, regression (2).27 
The DiD results are consistent with the event study.  Large firms gain, relative to small 
firms, when the legal changes are adopted.  They do not gain or lose relative to small firms at 
other times.  The regression discontinuity approach provides evidence that we are not simply 
capturing a size effect which coincides with but is unrelated to the governance reforms.  The 
gain to large firms remains stable, and perhaps even grows, as we shrink the size band for the 
treatment group. 
5.3. DiD for other East Asian countries 
As a further check on whether our results are likely to be causal, we assess in Table 6 
whether large firms gained relative to mid-sized firms in other East Asian countries during May-
December 1999.  If regional factors (such as recovery from the crisis, or exports to China) 
disproportionately benefited large firms, this might be reflected in these other countries.  This 
check is similar in spirit to a triple-difference analysis; the third difference is Korea versus 
comparable countries. 
Table 6, Panel A presents simple results, with Δ[ln(Tobin’s q)] as dependent variable, and 
constant term and large-firm dummy (local currency equivalent of 2 trillion won) as independent 
variables.  The control group is mid-sized firms with assets at year-end 1998 of 0.5–2 trillion 
won; the treatment group is large firms with assets from 2–8 trillion won.  The first three 
columns present separate results for Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.  Column (4) presents 
pooled results for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.  These countries are the most similar to 
Korea in the intensity of the East Asian crisis, but have too few large firms to make single-
                                            
27  We thank Andrew Metrick for raising this concern with DiD standard errors, and Jon Klick for suggesting the 
bootstrap analysis. 
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country regressions meaningful.  Column (5) pools all six countries.  Regressions that cover 
more than one country include country dummies. 
There is no evidence of positive returns to large firms, relative to mid-sized firms.  The 
coefficients on large-firm dummy are small, more often negative than positive, and negative and 
marginally significant in the pooled regression (5).  If we expand the control group down to 
0.25 trillion won, and expand the treatment group to include all firms over 2 trillion won, to 
increase the chance that we would find relative gains to large firms if they exist, the coefficient 
for Hong Kong becomes significant and negative [-0.0191 (t = 2.38)], as does the pooled 
coefficient [-0.0117 (t = 2.13)]. 
In Table 6, Panel B, we assess whether there is any evidence of relative gains for larger 
firms, by replacing large-firm dummy with ln(assets).  The coefficients on ln(assets) are 
insignificant and of mixed sign.  If we expand the sample size range to 0.25 trillion and up, the 
coefficients on ln(assets) are negative for all countries and significant for Hong Kong and for all 
six countries together.  Thus, the multicountry DiD results, like the event study results above, 
show no evidence of gains to large firms in other East Asian countries during our event period. 
5.4. Post-reform trends in profitability and growth 
As a further plausibility check on the governance explanation for our results, we assess 
whether large-firm profitability or growth changed after the reforms, relative to mid-sized firms.  
The governance rules adopted in 1999 came into force partly in 2000, and fully only with spring 
2001 annual shareholder meetings.  Also, a change in board structure is likely to affect firm 
behavior with a lag of uncertain duration.  Thus, if governance affects large firms’ performance, 
we would expect any effect to show up in 2002 or later.  Conversely, if large firms’ prospects 
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improved in the second half of 1999, relative to mid-sized firms, for reasons unrelated to 
governance, performance measures might show different trends for the two groups during 1999-
2000, which is too early for the changes to be explained by governance.  Figure 7, Panel A 
shows profitability trends for large firms, relative to mid-sized firms.  Panel B shows sales 
growth trends.  The DiD specification is similar to that for Figure 6, with different dependent 
variables and annual instead of semiannual data. 
The relative profitability of large firms, measured as earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT)/assets, drops in 1999, and then gradually returns to its 1998 level by 2002.  The further 
rise in 2003, to above the 2002 level, could plausibly be partly because of the governance 
reforms.  Sales growth is flat in 1999, and then drops beginning in 2000.  For both variables, 
the lack of a favorable trend in 1999 or soon thereafter is consistent with a governance rather 
than a performance explanation for the 1999 rise in large firms’ share prices.  In unreported 
regressions, we also find no evidence of a change in dividends, capital expenditures, or other 
measures of firm-level outcomes, which occurs during or soon after the 1999 share price rise, yet 
too soon for the reforms to contribute to a change in firm-level outcomes. 
6. Firm fixed effects and random effects regressions 
We next examine the reaction of both large and small firms to governance reforms, using 
a firm fixed effects framework.  This analysis has three main goals.  First, the inference that 
investors assigned value to mandatory board reforms for large firms will be stronger if investors 
assign similar value to voluntary changes at smaller firms.  Conversely, the large-firm results 
will be less convincing if voluntary adopters see no share price reaction. Since small-firm 
reforms are voluntary and hence possibly endogenous, we lack an identification strategy for 
  - 29 - 
these firms.  Thus, the small-firm results are a robustness check on the large-firm results, and do 
not provide a separate basis for causal inference. 
Second, the firm fixed effects regressions let us estimate how much of the value increase 
is due to each of the three requirements:  50% outside directors; audit committees; and outside 
director nominating committees.  Small firms can choose which of these measures to adopt, and 
can adopt different measures at different times.  We use this variation to estimate the separate 
association between each reform and Tobin’s q.  The fixed effects regressions also let us assess 
board structure elements which are not legally required—more than 50% independent directors 
or a compensation committee. 
Third, these results provide evidence on the within-firm, across-time association between 
governance and firm market value for smaller Korean firms.28 
6.1. Methodology 
Although we lack an identification strategy for small firms, we have several reasons to 
believe that endogeneity concerns for these firms are likely to be limited.  First, we use firm 
fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, year dummies to control for time 
trends, and extensive control variables to control for time-varying firm characteristics.  Table 3 
defines our control variables.  Second, we find in separate work (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006b) 
that firm characteristics only weakly predict small firms’ governance choices.  Third, in 
unreported results, we assess the extent of endogeneity using three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regressions, and find only mild evidence that Tobin’s q predicts governance.  Our 3SLS 
                                            
28 Much of the prior research on boards of directors in emerging markets uses only cross-sectional data.  
Choi, Park, and Yoo (2007) have time series data, so they can potentially use firm fixed effects, but they report that 
their results on the value of outside directors disappear with this specification. 
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specification is discussed in section 7. 
A separate concern is that different aspects of governance often correlate with each other.  
For example, firms that change board structure may also change board procedures; firms with 
independent boards may have better disclosure practices; and so on.  This could introduce 
omitted variable bias if one studies board structure without controlling for other aspects of 
governance.  To address this risk, in regressions with Board Structure Index as an independent 
variable of interest, we control for (KCGI - Board Structure) or sometimes separately for 
Ownership Parity and (KCGI - Board Structure - Ownership Parity).  In regressions with Board 
Independence Subindex as the independent variable of interest, we control for (KCGI - Board 
Independence) and so on.29 
In Korea, outside directors were rare prior to the East Asian financial crisis, but firms 
rapidly adopted them thereafter, partly due to the legal rules discussed above, but also voluntarily.  
Audit committees were not permitted prior to the crisis, but once they were authorized, a 
significant number of small firms adopted them.  By the end of our sample period, 44 small 
firms (10% of our sample) had voluntarily adopted 50% outside directors, 59 firms (9% of our 
sample) had more than 50% outside directors, 67 small firms (15% of our sample) had 
voluntarily adopted audit committees, and 90 small firms (21% of our sample) had voluntarily 
adopted an outside director nominating committee. These changes provide enough time variation 
to make a firm fixed effects specification feasible. 
6.2. Results for board structure 
                                            
29 We obtain almost identical results if we control for (KCGI - Board Structure Index), or for both Ownership Parity 
and (KCGI - Board Structure Index - Ownership Parity).  We obtain similar results but somewhat larger standard 
errors if we control for Board Procedure, Disclosure, and Shareholder Rights indices separately, instead of grouping 
them together.  The larger standard errors are expected due to colinearity, because the Shareholder Rights, Board 
Procedure, and Disclosure indices all correlate positively with Board Structure Index. 
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In Table 7, we report OLS, firm random effects, and firm fixed effects (with an 
unbalanced panel) regressions; results are similar in all cases.  All regressions use year 
dummies, robust standard errors, and firm clusters.30  Regressions (1)–(3) show full sample 
results.  Regression (4) reports fixed effects results for small firms.  The coefficient on Board 
Structure Index is economically and statistically significant, and is similar for all firms and for 
only small firms.  The predicted increase in Tobin’s q for a small firm that adopts the three 
large-firm reforms is 0.0088 * 12-point increase in Board Structure Index = 10.6%, which is 
comparable to the large firm increase shown in the DiD results in Section 5.  This is consistent 
with governance driving the large-firm results, rather than an omitted factor associated with firm 
size.31 
6.3. Results for components of board structure 
In Table 8, we examine the components of Board Structure Index.  We show firm 
random effects and firm fixed effects results.32  In Panel A, we use Board Independence and 
Board Committee Subindices as separate independent variables. Each is significant for the full 
sample. 
                                            
30 We obtain similar fixed effects results with a balanced panel, and similar results with ln(market/book) as 
dependent variable.  With regard to regression method, a Breusch-Pagan test strongly rejects pooled OLS compared 
to firm random effects.  The choice between random and fixed effects is closer.  A Hausman test usually, but not 
always, finds a significant difference in coefficients.  For Table 7, regression (2), the λ coefficient, which expresses 
whether random effects is closer to OLS (λ=0) or fixed effects (λ=1) (see Wooldridge, 2008, chapter 14.2) is 0.71, 
indicating similarity to fixed effects.  Thus, any bias in random effects coefficients is likely to be limited. 
31 Commenters suggested the following story for our large-firm results:  The 1999 reforms signaled that the 
government would monitor and regulate large firms; the price rise is due to the signal, rather than the specific 
reforms adopted in 1999.  In DiD terminology, the treatment applied to large firms was board structure reform plus 
other unspecified government oversight, and we cannot untangle the effects of each.  If this story is right, and board 
structure reforms do not explain our large-firm results, we might expect to find no or smaller effects for smaller 
firms which voluntarily change board structure, because there is no reason for these firms to face increased 
government oversight.  We instead find similar value increases for large and small firms.  This provides evidence 
that investors expecting other unspecified government oversight of large firms does not drive our large-firm results. 
32 Full sample results are similar with pooled OLS, and with firm fixed effects with balanced panel. 
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The next two panels in Table 8 break down each subindex into its individual elements. In 
Panel B, the components of Board Independence—element b1 (50% outside directors) and 
element b2 (> 50% outside directors)—are separately positive and significant.  Getting to 50% 
outside directors predicts 8% higher Tobin's q, while going beyond 50% predicts an additional 6% 
increase.  In Panel C, we study the components of Board Committee Index.  Audit committee 
is significant and predicts a 4% increase in Tobin's q, director nominating committee is 
marginally significant, and compensation committee is positive but insignificant.33 
In each panel, regression (3) is limited to small firms.  The board independence results 
are similar to those for all firms.  The board committee results for small firms are weaker and 
are not statistically significant, but are not statistically distinguishable from the large-firm results. 
In sum, we find for small firms strong evidence that 50% outside directors predicts higher 
market value; reasonably strong evidence that having more than 50% outside directors also does 
so; and some evidence that having an audit committee separately predicts higher market value. 
This evidence is consistent with the investment strategy of the Korea Corporate Governance 
Fund, managed by Lazard Asset Management.  This fund invests in small firms, pressures them 
to add outside directors and an audit committee, and sells after the reforms are adopted.34 
                                            
33 In robustness checks with ln(market/book) as dependent variable, Board Independence Subindex remains 
significant.  Board Committee Subindex as a whole is positive but insignificant; audit committee (in Panel C) is 
marginally significant.  We also study various subsamples: (i) financial vs. non-financial firms (our sample already 
excludes banks), (ii) chaebol firms vs. non-chaebol firms, and (iii) manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing firms. 
Board Structure Index, Board Independence Subindex, and 50% outside directors are positive and significant across 
all subsamples. 
34 Hasung Jang, our coauthor in Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a, 2006b), is an advisor to this fund.  The Korean 
Center for Good Corporate Governance (CGCG), with which Woochan Kim is affiliated, is a consultant to this fund. 
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7. Instrumental variable analysis 
Our final methodological approach is instrumental variable analysis.  Our instrument for 
board structure is "large-firm IV," defined to equal large-firm dummy during 1999-2004, but zero 
in 1998 regardless of firm size.35 We place the IV analysis last not because it is least important, 
but because it is least new, for two reasons.  First, BJK relies on a similar analysis using this 
instrument, with cross-sectional data from 2001,  Second, the mathematical structure of two-
stage least squares (2SLS) analysis is closely similar to a DiD analysis in which we use the full 
post-reform period to estimate the impact of the reforms (rather than the period-by-period 
approach we adopt in Part 5).36  The IV analysis can be seen as providing a robustness check on 
the DiD results. 
7.1. IV validity 
A valid instrument must be exogenous, correlated with the instrumented variable (Board 
Structure Index), and should predict the dependent variable (ln(Tobin's q) only indirectly and 
only through the instrumented variable, and not directly.  We address each requirement in turn. 
7.1.1. Exogeneity 
Large-firm IV is likely to be exogenous.  The large firm rules do not correspond to 
voluntary firm behavior prior to the 1999 adoption of the rules.  At year-end 1998, only one of 
the 51 large firms in our sample with available data had 50% outside directors; none had an audit 
committee or an outside director nominating committee.  There is no evidence that firms reduce 
                                            
35 We confirm in unreported regressions that large-firm dummy predicts Tobin's q beginning at year-end 1999, but 
not before. We thank Oghuzan Ozbas for suggesting this form for our instrumental variable. 
36 We thank the referee for noticing this.  Once the referee did so, it was obvious, but it had not been so to us or 
other readers of the paper. 
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or limit their size to avoid compliance with the rules.  We have heard no anecdotal evidence of 
this, there is no clustering of firms at a size just below the regulatory threshold, and of the four 
firms which become subject to the rules but later drop below the threshold, three retain 50% 
outside directors and all retain an audit committee.37 
7.1.2. Correlation between instrument and instrumented variable 
Large-firm IV correlates strongly with Board Structure Index.  The overall correlation 
over 2000–2004 is r= 0.69; annual correlations are at least 0.70 in each year during this period.38 
7.1.3. Direct or indirect prediction of Tobin’s q? 
The harder questions for instrument validity are first, whether large-firm IV predicts 
Tobin's q directly or only indirectly; and second, whether indirect prediction is only through 
Board Structure Index, or also partly through the rest of KCGI. 
With regard to direct prediction of Tobin's q:  First, in all regressions, we control for the 
continuous effect of ln(assets) on Tobin's q. Second, the coefficient on ln(assets) is negative and 
significant, both for all firms and for subsamples of large and small firms.  This implies that 
larger firms are worse at turning asset dollars into market value dollars.  Yet large-firm IV is 
large and positive.  It would be a remarkable coincidence for the ability of firms to turn assets 
                                            
37 We examine the shrinkers individually and confirm that three of the four shrinkers suffer business reversals.  
The fourth conducts a spinoff, but this firm retains the large firm governance elements and promptly grows to 
become large again; thus the spinoff could not have been intended to avoid the governance rules.  There are also 
three firms which shrink from large to small during the period of adoption of the reforms (June-December, 1999).  
Two later become large again; the third continues to shrink. 
38 At year-end 1999, the correlation between large-firm dummy and Board Structure Index is only 0.08 (not 
significant), because large firms have not yet had time to comply with the newly adopted rules.  We nonetheless 
treat large-firm IV as an appropriate instrument in 1999, because share values anticipate a future change in board 
structure, even though board structures have not yet changed.  Thus, large-firm IV predicts the dependent variable 
(Tobin’s q) through its future effect on the instrumented variable (Board Structure Index), which has a current effect 
on firm value. 
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into market value to decline with size both below and above 2 trillion won; jump at precisely the 
point where governance rules kick in, and do so beginning in 1999, when the governance rules 
were adopted, for a reason other than governance. Third, if we add large-firm IV as an 
independent variable in the regressions in Table 7, the coefficient on Board Structure Index is 
similar to that in Table 7, while large-firm IV is insignificant, consistent with large-firm IV 
predicting Tobin's q only indirectly through Board Structure Index, rather than directly. Fourth, 
although we control for ln(assets), large-firm IV could proxy for higher-order terms in the 
functional form of a direct relation between size and Tobin's q.  We address this concern in 
unreported robustness checks by using a six powers of ln(assets) to control for firm size.  The 
IV results survive this test. 
7.1.4. Predict Tobin’s q only through Board Structure Index? 
In BJK, it was not clear whether we should treat large-firm dummy as an instrument for 
all of KCGI, or only for Board Structure Index.  The concern with instrumenting only for Board 
Structure Index is that, even with a separate control for ln(assets), large-firm IV could predict 
other components of KCGI (for example, Disclosure Index), which in turn could separately 
predict Tobin’s q.  If we omit Disclosure Index from the 2SLS regression, we will impute the 
predicted effect of large-firm IV on Tobin’s q entirely to the Board Structure channel, and thus 
might overstate the impact of a change in Board Structure on Tobin’s q.  A partial solution is to 
add Disclosure Index as an independent variable in the 2SLS regressions.  However, if 
Disclosure is endogenous to Board Structure and Tobin’s q, we could still get a biased coefficient 
on instrumented Board Structure.  If we instead use large-firm IV to instrument for all of KCGI, 
we avoid this problem, but lose the ability to assess from the IV analysis which components of 
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KCGI are responsible for the estimated effect.  A further complication is that large firms, 
having changed board structure, might then change their disclosure practices.  One might see 
this effect as properly attributable to the initial board structure change. 
Fortunately, for our dataset, these potential complications are not important.  We first 
separate KCGI into Board Structure Index (BS); Ownership Parity Index (OP), and the rest of 
KCGI (KCGI – OP – BS). Ownership Parity is weakly correlated with large-firm dummy (r = -
.06) and so is not of concern.  The remainder of KCGI is correlated with large-firm IV (r = 
0.41).  However, the coefficient on (KCGI – OP – BS) is insignificant and economically small 
(see Table 7, regression (3)). Thus, if we use large-firm IV to instrument for Board Structure 
Index, any bias in the 2SLS coefficient should be small, whether or not we separately control for 
OP and (KCGI – OP – BS).  If large-firm dummy predicts (KCGI – OP – BS), which then 
predicts Tobin’s q, the coefficient on instrumented Board Structure Index should be larger if we 
do not control for (KCGI – OP – BS).  In practice, the coefficients on instrumented Board 
Structure Index are similar both ways. 
7.2. 2SLS results 
In Table 9, we present 2SLS results, using large-firm IV to instrument for Board Structure 
Index.  We present two models.  In Model (A), we control for Ownership Parity and the rest of 
KCGI.  In Model (B) we omit these controls.39  In the second stage regressions, instrumented 
Board Structure Index strongly predicts ln(Tobin's q). The 2SLS coefficient is similar in both 
                                            
39 Other control variables as the same as in Table 7 except that we exclude the MSCI Index and ADR dummy 
variables due to high correlation with large-firm dummy. In robustness checks, pooled OLS results are similar, as are 
firm random effects results (though we cannot combine clustering with random effects), and results with 
ln(market/book) as the dependent variable. 
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models, and is somewhat larger than in Table 7 (at 0.0144 for Model (A), versus 0.0101 in Table 
7). 
7.3. Assessing the extent of endogeneity 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2008) is available for pooled 
OLS with firm clusters.  This test assumes large-firm IV is a valid instrument for Board 
Structure Index.  It is similar to 2SLS, with the same first stage.  In the second stage, we 
regress ln(Tobin’s q) on Board Structure Index, control variables, and the residual from the first-
stage regression.  A significant coefficient on the residual is evidence of endogeneity.  In 
unreported regressions, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test based on Model (A) from Table 9 does not 
reject the null of no endogeneity with ln(Tobin’s q) as dependent variable (coefficient = -0.0040, 
t = 1.11), but does reject the null with ln(market/book) as a measure of firm value, thus providing 
mild evidence of endogeneity. 
If we had a valid instrument for Tobin’s q, in addition to our (here, assumed valid) 
instrument for Board Structure Index, we could use three stage least squares regressions to assess 
whether within-firm change in Tobin’s q predicts board structure, and thus whether reverse 
causation is an important concern.  We have no strong instrument for ln(Tobin's q), but have 
several respectable instruments, in R&D/sales, advertising/sales, and EBIT/sales.  Theory 
predicts that these variables should predict Tobin's q and they in fact do so (see Table 7).  They 
have no obvious theoretical connection to board structure; and do not predict board structure in 
unreported regressions similar to Table 7 with Board Structure Index as dependent variable.40  
The 3SLS equations are: 
                                            
40 A Hansen overidentification test (which assume one valid instrument) suggests that these instruments are 
appropriate (p = 0.485 for ln(Tobin's q); p = 0.999 for ln(market/book)). 
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ln(Tobin’s q)= f (Board Structure Index, instruments for Tobin's q, other variables) +     (3) 
Board Structure Index = g (ln(Tobin’s q), large-firm IV, other variables) +      (4) 
The 3SLS procedure is available with firm fixed effects, but not with firm clusters.  In 
unreported 3SLS regressions, we find some evidence of reverse causation. Instrumented 
ln(Tobin's q) is a marginally significant, and instrumented ln(market/book) is significant, as a 
predictor of Board Structure Index.  However, statistical significance would likely disappear if 
we could use firm clusters.  A one-standard-deviation (0.35) change in ln(Tobin's q) predicts 
about a one- point increase in Board Structure Index. 
Thus, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and 3SLS provide consistent evidence.  There is 
mild evidence of overall endogeneity and of reverse causation, in which a within-firm change in 
ln(Tobin's q) predicts modestly higher Board Structure Index. 
8. Conclusion 
Outside directors and audit committees are widely considered to be central elements of 
good corporate governance.  Yet compelling evidence to support this conventional wisdom is 
limited.  We offer here evidence that board structure reforms can positively affect firm market 
values, and perhaps firm performance, in an emerging market.  We rely on Korea's 1999 
adoption of legal rules which apply to large but not small Korean firms, as a shock to governance.  
We use a combination of event study, DiD, and IV approaches to provide evidence that these 
reforms predict firm value when they should (large firms' market values increase, relative to mid-
sized firms, when the reforms are adopted) and where they should in size (firm values jump at 
the regulatory threshold).  We use a regression discontinuity framework to control for a possible 
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direct effect of firm size on market value.  Although each of our empirical strategies has 
potential flaws, their combined use provides stronger evidence than any one alone. 
There is no comparable jump at other times in the value of large firms, relative to mid-
sized firms, and no value jump at other sizes.  We find no evidence that the adoption period was 
an especially good one for large firms, for non-governance reasons. We confirm, with firm fixed 
effects, that value increases for small firms, which voluntarily reform, are similar to those for 
large firms.  The increased value comes primarily from board independence, and perhaps also 
from audit committees. 
The effect of the reforms is economically large—a roughly 13% increase in Tobin's q, or 
about a 46% increase in share price.  The value increase persists over time.  Thus, Korean 
investors valued the reforms when they were adopted, and did not change their views later, after 
experience with the reforms’ actual effects.  Over time, an increasing number of small firms 
reform their own boards and obtain similar value increases.  
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Large firms (balanced panel, 28 firms) 
 
Mid-sized firms (balanced panel, 64 firms) 
 
Figure 1. Board Independence and Board Committees Subindices.  Figures show mean values of Board 
Independence Subindex (0~10) and Board Committees Subindex (0~10) from year-end 1998 through year-end 2004, 
for balanced panels of large Korean public firms (assets > 2 trillion won) and mid-sized Korean public firms (0.25 
trillion won < assets < 2 trillion won), respectively. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative returns for large-plus and mid-sized firms, 1998–1999. Cumulative returns to "large-plus" 
Korean firms (assets from 1–4 trillion won at year-end 1998), and mid-sized firms (assets from 0.5–1 trillion won) 
during 1998 and 1999.  Base level for each group is set to 100 at December 31, 1997.  Vertical lines indicate event 
1 minus 2 days (June 1, 1999) and event 3 plus 3 days (August 30, 1999).  Events are described in Table 1. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative market-adjusted returns for large-plus firms. Percentage cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) 
to equally weighted portfolio of 47 "large-plus" Korean firms (assets from 1–4 trillion won at year-end 1998), relative to 
Mid-sized Index (equally weighted index of 54 firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won), from April 30-December 31, 1999 
(in percentage terms).  CMAR is set to zero at April 30, 1999.  Vertical lines show day 0 for event 1 (June 3), event 2 (July 
2), and event 3 (August 25).  Events are described in Table 1. 
  
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
19
99
04
30
19
99
05
12
19
99
05
21
19
99
06
01
19
99
06
10
19
99
06
21
19
99
06
30
19
99
07
09
19
99
07
20
19
99
07
29
19
99
08
09
19
99
08
18
19
99
08
27
19
99
09
08
19
99
09
17
19
99
09
30
19
99
10
11
19
99
10
20
19
99
10
29
19
99
11
09
19
99
11
18
19
99
11
29
19
99
12
08
19
99
12
17
19
99
12
28
C
M
A
R
 (%
)
  - 46 - 
Panel A.  Events 1–3 Panel B.  Events 2–3 
  
Figure 4.  Scatter plot of CMAR versus firm size. Scatter plot of cumulative market-adjusted return (CMAR) relative to 
Mid-Sized Index (firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won) versus ln(assets), for Korean firms with assets from 0.5–4 trillion 
won.  Panel A shows CMAR over a [-2, +62] event window relative to event 1 (covering events 1–3).  Panel B shows 
CMAR over a [-2, + 41] event window relative to event 2 (covering events 2–3).  In each figure, vertical line indicates 1 
trillion won; horizontal line below 1 trillion won shows mean CMAR for control firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won 
(mean = 0 by construction), longer (shorter) horizontal line above 1 trillion won shows mean CMAR for firms with assets 
from 1–4 trillion (1–1.5 trillion won).  Panel A:  Change in CMAR at 1 trillion won = 0.1594 (t = 2.24 from pooled 
regression of CMARs on constant and large-plus dummy (=1 if assets > 1 trillion won) for broader treatment group and 
0.1678 (t =1.86) for narrower treatment group. Panel B:  change in CMAR at 1 trillion won = 0.1363 (t = 3.16) for broader 
treatment group and 0.1230 (t 1.72) for narrow treatment group.  Regressions exclude firms for which a studentized residual 
from regressing CMAR on large-plus dummy exceeds ±1.96.  t-Statistics are computed using industry-group clusters.  
Scatter plots suppress outliers with CMAR < -0.5 or > +0.7.  Events are described in Table 1. 
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Figure 5.  Cumulative returns for large-plus and mid-sized firms in other Asian countries. Cumulative returns to "large-plus" 
firms (assets > 1 trillion won at year-end 1998), and mid-sized firms (assets from 0.25–1 trillion won) during 1999, for Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, based on currency exchange rates at December 31, 1998.  
Base level for each group is set to 100 at December 31, 1998.  Number of large-plus (mid-sized) firms = 268 (1,110); of 
which 81 (240) are for Hong Kong; 19 (146) are for Indonesia; 47 (321) are for Malaysia; 46 (137) are for Singapore; 53 (114) 
are for Taiwan; and 22 (152) are for Thailand. 
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Panel A:  Main treatment group (2–8T)  Panel B:  Narrow treatment group (2–4T) 
 
Figure 6.  Difference-in-differences using ln(Tobin’s q). Panel A: Solid line depicts the coefficients on large-firm dummy 
(=1 if assets > 2 trillion won) from cross-sectional regressions of Δln(Tobin’s q) from May 1999 to indicated period on large-
firm dummy and constant term, run every six months from December 1997 through December 2001 (we replace June 1999 
with May 1999 because the principal legislative events begin in early June 1999).  Dashed lines show 5%–95% confidence 
interval around the point estimates, using robust standard errors.  Control group in each period is mid-sized firms (assets 
from 0.5–2 trillion won) at May 1999; treatment group is large firms with assets from 2–8 trillion won at May 1999, but 
excludes one firm with 50% outside directors at this date.  At December 1999, sample is 45 large firms and 110 mid-sized 
firms. Panel B: Same as Panel A, except treatment group is limited to large firms with assets from 2–4 trillion won at May 
1999 (n = 28 at December 1999). 
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Panel A:  EBIT/Assets   Panel B:  Sales Growth 
 
Figure 7.  Difference-in-differences for profitability and growth. Panel A: Solid line depicts the coefficients on large-firm 
dummy (=1 if assets > 2 trillion won) from cross-sectional regressions of Δ(EBIT/Assets)τ,0 = [(EBIT/Assets)τ – 
(EBIT/Assets)Dec. 1999] on large-firm dummy and a constant term, from December 1998 through December 2004.  Dependent 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Dashed lines show 90% confidence interval. Control and treatment groups are 
same as in Figure 6, Panel A.  At December 2000, sample is 44 large firms and 103 mid-sized firms. Panel B: Similar to 
Panel A except variable of interest is sales growth. 
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Table 1 
Key announcement dates for 1999 Korean governance reforms. 
Key announcements for 1999 reforms to rules governing outside directors, audit committees, and nominating committees 
for listed Korean firms, from search of KINDS (Korean Integrated News Database System) database, which includes all 
major Korean newspapers.  Announcements used in event study are in boldface. 
Event Dates Information 
 1998: various 1998 reforms, effective starting with 1999 annual meetings, require all listed firms to have 
a minimum of 25% outside directors. 
 March 18, 1999 Corporate Governance Reform Committee created to recommend reforms. 
 May 24–26, 1999 President appoints new Minister of Finance and Economy and other economic ministers; 
instructs them to focus on chaebol reform, they so report to the press. 
1 June 2, 1999 News articles:  government economic policy will shift from "lower leverage" to 
"corporate governance reform" (understood to include independent directors and 
audit committees). 
June 3, 1999 Speech by new Minister of Finance and Economy: chaebol reform will focus on 
corporate governance reform. 
 June 25, 1999 Ministry of Finance and Economy says some provisions in the Korean Corporate 
Governance Code will be mandated by law, mentions higher outside director ratio, audit 
committees, and minority shareholders’ rights. 
2 July 2, 1999 Government announces that audit committee, dominated by outside directors, will be 
mandated for large firms (size threshold is not specified). 
3 Aug. 25, 1999 Government announces plans to require large firms (news stories speculate that 
threshold will be 1 trillion won) to have 50% outside directors and a director 
nomination committee, dominated by outside directors.  Ministry of Justice 
announces a reform bill to allow companies to adopt board committees, including an 
audit committee with at least three members, including at least 2/3 outside directors, 
instead of an internal auditor.  Proposal also includes more details on previously 
announced chaebol reforms, of which the most significant were limits on investments 
by one chaebol member in another and board approval and disclosure of large 
related party transactions. 
Aug. 26, 1999 Corporate Governance Reform Committee releases first draft of proposed Corporate 
Governance Code.  For large firms (over 1 trillion won), the Code recommends 50% 
outside directors.  For all firms, it recommends (i) an audit committee, with at least 
one member having expertise in auditing; (ii) an outside director nominating 
committee; (iii) a board with at least eight directors; (iv) cumulative voting for 
directors. 
 Sept. 21–29, 1999 Government announces that it is considering raising the size threshold to 2 trillion won. 
 Nov. 22, 1999 Government submits a bill to require large firms to have:  (i) at least 50% outside 
directors; (ii) at least three outside directors; (iii) an audit committee composed of at least 
2/3 outside directors; (iv) an outside director nomination committee composed of at least 
50% outside directors. 
 Dec. 16, 1999 National Assembly passes a bill to revise the Securities Transaction Act to require large 
firms to have 50% outside directors, an audit committee, and an outside director 
nomination committee. The supplementary provisions clarify effective dates. Audit 
committee, outside director nomination committee, and a minimum of three outside 
directors are required as of the first annual general meeting of shareholders (AGM) after 
January 21, 2000.  The 50% outside director ratio should be met on the first AGM after 
fiscal year 2000. 
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Table 2 
Construction of Korea Corporate Governance Index (KCGI), 1998–2004. 
This table shows (i) the governance elements used to construct KCGI; (ii) data sources; and (iii) the rules we use to fill in missing information.  Element labels are consistent 
with Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a) (shown in mid-2001 column).  Data sources are: director database, ownership database, annual surveys by the Korea Corporate Governance 
Service (KCGS) beginning spring 2001, and hand-collection.  KCGS surveys are in spring of each year and provide end-of-prior-year information, except as shown.  We extrapolate 
for missing elements as follows: (i) if an element is available in year X, but not in year X+1 (X-1), we extrapolate year X value to year X+1 (X-1).  We interpolate for missing firms 
and missing elements using the following rules applied sequentially: (i) if a firm answers the KCGS survey in years X and X+2, but not year X+1, we use in year X+1 the average of 
the X and X+2 values; and (ii) if an element is available in years X and X+2, but not year X+1, we use in year X+1 the average of the X and X+2 values.  We assume elements are 
present if they are legally required.  Italics indicate legally required elements. For hand-collection, we generally collect values in year X only for firms which had this governance 
element in year X+1.  Thus, for compensation committee, we have KCGS data starting in 2002.  We hand-collect data for 2001 for firms which had this committee in 2002, collect 
data for 2000 for firms which had this committee in 2001, etc.  For some elements, a change in KCGS methodology led to inconsistency between responses for different years.  For 
these questions, we either replace a 1 value in year X with 0 if the X+1 value is 0, or replace a 0 value in year X with 1 if the X+1 value was 1, as seemed appropriate given the nature 
of the element.  Details on these and other adjustments to the KCGS raw data are available from the authors on request. 
Date 1998–2000 Mid–2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Shareholder Rights Index (A)       
Firm permits cumulative voting for election of directors. hand-collect A1 I-3-① 1-(16) 1-A-(4) 1-A-(4) 
Firm permits voting by mail. hand-collect A2 I-3-② 1-(17) 1-A-(5) 1-A-(5) 
Firm discloses director candidates to shareholders in 
advance of shareholder meeting. hand-collect A4 I-9-③ required required required 
Board approval required for related-party transactions 
(required in 2000 for top 10 chaebol, mid-2001 for all 
chaebol, 2001 on for large and chaebol firms). 
hand-collect A5 II-2-6-① same as 2001 same as 2001 same as 2001 
 
Board Structure Index (B)       
Firm has at least 50% outside directors(rule adopted 
1999 required beginning mid-2001 for large firms). director database B1 I-2-③, II-2-1 director database 2-A-(1) 2-A-(1) 
Firm has more than 50% outside directors (director 
database except as indicated). director database B2 I-2-③, II-2-1 
1 for large firms if 1 in 
2003 or 2-A-(1) ≥ 2 
2-A-(1) for large 
firms 
2-A-(1) for large 
firms 
Firm has outside director nominating committee (rule 
adopted 1999, required from mid-2001 for large firms). hand-collect B3 II-3-4 2-B-(12), 2-B-(13) 2-A-(9) 2-A-(9) 
Audit committee of the board of directors exists (rule 
adopted 1999, required from mid-2001 for large firm). hand-collect B4 I-6-① 4-(1) 4-(1) 4-(1) 
Firm has compensation committee. hand-collect hand-collect hand-collect hand-collect 2-A-(10) 2-A-(10) 
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Board Procedure Index (C) 
      
Directors’ positions on board meeting agenda items are 
recorded in board minutes. hand-collect 
C2 II-2-6-② 2-B-(4) 2-B-(21) same as 2003 
Board chairman is an outside director or (from 2003) 
firm has outside director as lead director. 0 firms 
C3 (0 firms) hand collect hand collect 2-A-(5) 2-A-(5) 
A system for evaluating directors exists. hand-collect C4 II-2-6-④ same as 2001 2-B-(39) 2-B-(34) 
A bylaw to govern board meetings exists. hand-collect C5 average of mid-2001 and 2002 
2-B-(18) 2-B-(16) same as 2003 
Firm holds four or more regular board meetings per year. hand-collect C6 I-4-②, II-2-3-① 2-B-(1) 2-B-(19) 2-B-(20) 
Firm has one or more foreign outside directors. hand-collect C7 director database 2-A-(10) 2-A-(6) 2-A-(6) 
Shareholders approve outside directors’ aggregate pay 
(separate from all directors' pay). hand-collect 
C11 same as mid-2001 same as 2003 2-B-(30) same as 2003 
Outside directors attend at least 70% of meetings, on 
average. 
same as mid-2001 
(missing if 0 outside 
directors] 
C12 I-1 2-A-(2) 2-B-34 2-B-(30) 
Board meeting solely for outside directors exists. hand-collect C15 II-3-15-③ 2-A-(3) 2-B-(35) 2-B-(31) 
100% outside directors on audit committee. same as mid-2001 (if committee exists] 
D1 II-4-1 4-(2) 4-(2) 4-(2) 
Bylaws governing audit committee (or internal auditor) 
exist. hand-collect 
D2 average of mid-2001 
and 2002 
4-(3) 4-(3) 4-(3) 
Audit committee includes person with expertise in 
accounting. hand-collect 
D3 II-4-2 average of 2001 and 
2003 
4-(10) 4-(11) 
Audit committee (or internal auditor) approves the 
appointment of the internal audit head. hand-collect 
D5 average of mid-2001 
and 2002 
4-(4) 4-(4) 4-(5) 
Audit committee meets ≥4 times per year. hand-collect D10 I-6-②, II-4-7-① 4-(7) 4-(7) 4-(7) 
 
Disclosure Index (E)       
Firm conducted investor relations activity in year 2000. same as mid-2001 E1 II-1-5 3-(1) 3-(1) 3-A-(1) 
Firm website includes resumes of board members. same as mid-2001 E2 average of mid-2001 and 2002 
3-(9) 3-(9) 3-B-(21) 
English disclosure exists. same as mid-2001 E3 average of mid-2001 and 2002 
3-(15) 3-(14) 3-A-(13) 
Ownership Parity (P)       
Ownership Parity = (1 – ownership disparity); disparity 
is ownership by all affiliated shareholders – ownership 
by controlling shareholder and family members. 
ownership database P ownership database ownership database ownership database 
ownership 
database 
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Table 3 
Principal variables. 
Definition and summary statistics for the principal dependent and independent variables used in this paper.  Panel A 
defines each variable.  Panel B provides summary statistics.  Book asset values are in billion won.  Book and market values 
are measured at year end, except that market values for mid-2001 are measured on June 30, 2001. 
Panel A: Variable definitions 
Variables Description 
  
Governance variables  
KCGI Korean Corporate Governance Index:  Sum of Board Structure, Shareholder Rights, Board 
Procedure, Disclosure, and Ownership Parity Indices 
Board Structure Index Sum of Board Structure Subindex + Board Independence Subindex 
Board Independence Subindex BI = (b1 + b2)/10 
b1 1 if firm has at least 50% outside directors, 0 otherwise 
b2 1 if firm has >50% outside directors, 0 otherwise 
Board Committee Subindex (b3 + b4 + b5)/10 
b3 1 if firm has outside director nomination committee, 0 otherwise 
b4 1 if firm has audit committee, 0 otherwise 
b5 1 if firm has compensation committee, 0 otherwise 
 
Other variables 
 
Mid-sized Firm Index Return to equally weighted index of 142 small Korean public firms with assets from 0.5–1 
trillion won at year-end 1998. 
Tobin’s q [Market value of assets / Book value of assets] measured at each year-end.  Market value 
of assets is estimated by [book value of debt + book value of preferred stock + market 
value of common stock]. 
Market-to-book ratio [Market value of common stock / Book value of common stock] measured at each year-
end, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  We drop firms with book value < 0. 
Years listed Number of years since original listing on Korea Stock Exchange. 
Leverage (Book value of debt)/ (Market value of common stock), winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Sales growth Geometric average sales growth during past five fiscal years (or available period if < five 
years).  If fiscal year changes, we keep years which cover a full 12 months. 
R&D/Sales Ratio of research and development (R&D) expense to sales.  Firms with missing data for 
R&D expense are assumed to have 0 values. 
Advertising/Sales Ratio of advertising expense to sales.  Firms with missing data for advertising expense are 
assumed to have 0 values. 
Exports/Sales Ratio of export revenue to sales.  Firms with missing data for export revenue are assumed 
to have 0 values. 
PPE/Sales Ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales. 
Capex/PPE Ratio of capital expenditures to PPE. 
EBIT/Sales Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales. 
Market share Firm’s share of total sales by all firms in the same 4-digit industry listed on KSE. 
Share turnover [Common shares traded during year / Common shares held by public shareholders].   
Denominator = [common shares outstanding x (1 – total affiliated ownership)]. 
Foreign ownership [Common shares held by foreign investors / common shares outstanding]. 
Sole ownership [Common shares held by controlling shareholder and family members / common shares 
outstanding]. 
Large-firm dummy Equals 1 if book value of assets > 2 trillion won at end of prior year, 0 otherwise. 
Chaebol dummy 1 if member of top-30 business groups (based on group assets) identified annually by 
Korea Fair Trade Commission; 0 otherwise. 
Level 1 ADR dummy 1 if firm has level 1 American Depository Receipts (ADRs); 0 otherwise. 
Level 2/3 ADR dummy 1 if firm has level 2 or level 3 ADRs; 0 otherwise. 
MSCI Index dummy 1 if firm is in Morgan Stanley Capital International Index; 0 otherwise. 
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Panel B: Summary statistics 
Variables 
No of 
"1" 
values 
Pooled 
mean 
Pooled 
median Min. Max. Std. Dev.
1998 
Mean 
2000 
Mean 
2002 
Mean 
2004 
Mean 
     
Governance variables     
KCGI  34.27 32.43 7.03 91.76 11.69 23.65 30.47 41.35 43.65 
Board Structure Index  1.95 0.00 0.00 20.00 4.00 0.11 1.40 3.14 3.34 
Board Independence   0.75 0.00 0.00 10.00 2.20 0.02 0.49 1.04 1.46 
b1 481 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.19 
b2 138 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.10 
Board Committee  1.21 0.00 0.00 10.00 2.33 0.09 0.91 2.09 1.88 
b3 762 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.01 0.12 0.35 0.29 
b4 678 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.01 0.14 0.26 0.24 
b5 62 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 
     
Other variables     
Tobin’s q  0.86 0.80 0.21 6.05 0.39 0.93 0.77 0.81 0.85 
ln(Tobin’s q)  -0.22 -0.23 -1.55 1.80 0.35 -0.11 -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 
ln(Market/book)  -0.67 -0.73 -9.23 7.18 0.83 -0.53 -1.00 -0.73 -0.63 
ln(Assets)  5.53 5.33 0.70 10.69 1.44 5.47 5.60 5.62 5.51 
Years listed  2.56 2.64 0.00 3.89 0.78 2.40 2.53 2.59 2.71 
Leverage  33.62 2.37 0.01 115000 1797 7.08 9.17 4.57 3.25 
Sales growth  0.27 0.08 -0.65 541.25 8.63 0.12 0.11 1.36 0.11 
R&D/Sales  0.01 0.00 0.00 7.69 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Advertising/Sales  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Exports/Sales  0.28 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.28 
PPE/Sales  0.54 0.39 0.00 36.05 1.11 0.54 0.59 0.45 0.49 
Capex/PPE  0.14 0.09 0.00 7.73 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.16 
EBIT/Assets  0.05 0.05 -1.03 0.55 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
EBIT/Sales  0.04 0.06 -30.78 0.97 0.52 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 
Market share  0.06 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Share turnover  14.93 4.65 0.03 17332 332 5.55 8.02 7.92 7.71 
Foreign ownership  7.59 0.91 0.00 94.11 13.56 5.89 6.62 8.21 10.84 
Sole ownership  19.97 19.85 0.00 78.81 16.46 20.83 19.93 20.06 20.41 
Large-firm dummy 429 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Chaebol dummy 833 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.19 
Level 1 ADR dummy 114 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Level 2/3 ADR dummy 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MSCI Index dummy 449 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.09 
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Table 4 
Basic event study results 
Events are described in Table 1; variables are defined in Table 3.  For event 1: Sample is firms with assets between 0.5–8 
trillion won, measured at year-end 1998.  Firms are excluded if a studentized residual from regressing event period return 
on chaebol dummy exceeds ±1.96.  For other events: Sample is firms with assets between 0.5–4 trillion (0.5–1.5 trillion) 
won for regression sets 1–3 (4–5).  Firms are excluded if a studentized residual from regressing event period return on 
large-plus dummy (=1 if assets > 1 trillion won) exceeds ±1.96.  All regressions include constant term (suppressed in table, 
insignificant in all cases).  Sample size (after excluding outliers) is shown for set 1; similar for other sets.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface (suppressed for 
constant term). 
Panel A. cumulative market-adjusted returns: Regression results 
Chaebol event (Event 1):  Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) to chaebol firms relative to Non-chaebol Index 
(equally weighted index of non-chaebol firms).  Size events:  CMARs to large-plus firms (assets > 1 trillion won) relative 
to Mid-Sized Index (equally weighted index of mid-sized firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won). Horserace (over events 
2–3):  Control group is non-chaebol firms with assets from 0.5–1 trillion won. Independent variables in regression set 1 are 
constant term and chaebol or large-plus dummy.  Set 2 adds ln(market cap); set 3 adds first six powers of ln(market cap).  
t-Statistics, using industry-group clusters, are in parentheses.  Event window for events 2–3 (1–3) is relative to event 2(1).  
Correlation between large-plus dummy and ln(market cap) = 0.48. 
Panel B. Classic event study 
Event 1:  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for event study of 64 chaebol firms in 17 industries relative to Non-
chaebol Index.  Other events:  CARs for 54 large-plus firms in 16 industries relative to Mid-Sized Index.  Market model 
estimation period is January-May and September-December 1999.  Industry CARs treat all firms in each industry as a 
single observation; portfolio CARs group all treatment firms together.  z-Statistics are in parentheses. 
Regres
-sion 
set 
Treatment 
group 
Event type Chaebol Size Size Size Size Horserace 
Event 1 2 3 2–3 1–3 2–3 
Event window (–2, +3) (–2, +3) (–2, +3) (–2, +41) (–2, +62) (–2, +41) 
Calendar dates 6/1– 6/8 6/30–7/7 8/23–8/30 6/30–8/30 6/1–8/30 6/30–8/30 
Panel A.  CMARs      
1 Basic regression      
Chaebol Chaebol dummy 0.0472***     0.0555 
(3.38)     (0.89) 
Main Large-plus dummy  0.0423** 0.0412** 0.1363*** 0.1594** 0.1043* 
 (2.52) (2.57) (3.16) (2.24) (1.86) 
 Control firms 50 46 44 48 43 33 
 Treated firms 60 48 52 48 49 68 
 Adjusted R2 0.0846 0.0537 0.0877 0.0792 0.0902 0.037 
        
2 Adding control for ln(market cap)       
Chaebol Chaebol dummy 0.0378**     0.0532 
(2.60)     (0.90) 
Main Large-plus dummy  0.0596** 0.0460*** 0.1673*** 0.1972** 0.1473** 
 (2.74) (2.87) (3.49) (2.61) (2.55) 
 ln(Market cap) 0.0137** -0.0178 -0.0051 -0.0351 0.1770  
 (2.28) (-1.36) (-0.75) (-1.24) (1.27)  
 Adjusted R2 0.1100 0.0723 0.0816 0.0860 0.0996 0.046 
       
3 Adding controls for six powers of ln(market cap))      
Chaebol Chaebol dummy 0.0388**     0.0402 
(2.52)     (0.68) 
Main Large-plus dummy  0.0653*** 0.0475*** 0.1585*** 0.1935** 0.1458** 
 (3.32) (3.24) (3.34) (2.33) (2.67) 
 Adjusted R2 0.0713 0.1540 0.0978 0.1251 0.0670 0.048 
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Regres
-sion 
set 
Treatment 
group 
Event type Chaebol Size Size Size Size Horserace 
Event 1 2 3 2–3 1–3 2–3 
Event window (–2, +3) (–2, +3) (–2, +3) (–2, +41) (–2, +62) (–2, +41) 
Calendar dates 6/1– 6/8 6/30–7/7 8/23–8/30 6/30–8/30 6/1–8/30 6/30–8/30 
4 Narrow treatment group with control for ln(market cap)    
Chaebol Chaebol dummy      0.0110 
     (0.15) 
Narrow Large-plus dummy  0.0354 0.0643*** 0.1684** 0.2120** 0.1811** 
 (1.48) (4.64) (2.42) (2.21) (2.32) 
Treated firms  14 17 17 16  
Adjusted R2  0.0626 0.1624 0.0895 0.0985 0.052 
 
Regres-
sion set 
Treatment 
group 
Event 1 2 3 2–3 1–3 
Panel B.  CARs      
Using industry CARs 
1 Chaebol Chaebol dummy 0.0354***     
(3.50)     
2 Main Large-plus dummy  0.0728*** 0.0158 0.1425*** 0.1732*** 
 (7.19) (1.60) (4.78) (4.69) 
  No. of industries 17 16 16 16 16 
3 Narrow Large-plus dummy  0.0686*** 0.0484*** 0.1510*** 0.1452*** 
 (5.45) (4.68) (3.66) (3.00) 
  No. of industries  11 11 11 11 
       
Using portfolio CARs 
4 Chaebol Chaebol dummy 0.0372*     
(1.85)     
5 Main Large-plus dummy  0.0724*** 0.0371* 0.1365** 0.1733*** 
 (3.30) (1.69) (2.30) (2.40) 
6 Narrow Large-plus dummy  0.0718*** 0.0601*** 0.1415*** 0.1667** 
 (3.27) (2.74) (2.38) (2.31) 
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Table 5 
Difference-in-differences:  market value 
Cross-sectional OLS regressions of ∆ln(Tobin’s q)[ln(Tobin’s q) in December 1999 minus ln(Tobin’s q) in May 1999] or ∆ln(market/book) (similarly defined) on 
large-firm dummy (=1 if assets > 2 trillion won at May 1999), constant, and other controls. In regressions (1-2), independent variables are large-firm dummy and constant 
term.  Regressions (3)–(10) add ln(assets) (at May 1999); regressions (7)–(10) add Δ(ln(assets)) from May-December 1999 and Δ(other control variables) during 1999 
(mid-year data not available).Treatment and control group size ranges (based on assets in trillion won at May 1999) as shown.  All regressions exclude one large firm 
which had 50% outside directors at year-end 1998.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-Statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in 
parentheses.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Panel A: Dependent variable - ∆ln(Tobin’s q) from May-Dec. 1999 
Large-firm dummy 0.1295** 0.1682** 0.1520* 0.1484* 0.1490** 0.1863** 0.1695 0.1840* 0.1201** 0.1713** 
(2.51) (2.31) (1.77) (1.77) (2.56) (2.46) (1.62) (1.66) (1.97) (2.45) 
ln(Assets)   -0.0163 0.0180 0.0063 0.0075 -0.0229 0.0044 0.0128 0.0267 
  (-0.41) (0.55) (0.62) (0.73) (-0.49) (0.11) (0.62) (1.23) 
           
∆(1st–6th powers of ln(assets)) N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
∆(Other control variables) N N N N N N N N Y Y 
Treatment group 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 
Control group 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T < 2T < 2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.25< 2T 0.25< 2T 
No. of large firms 45 28 45 28 45 28 45 28 45 28 
No. of control firms 110 110 110 110 561 561 110 110 161 161 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.32 
r (large-firm dummy, ln(assets))   0.76 0.84 0.47 0.59 0.76 0.84 0.81 0.71 
           
Panel B: Dependent variable - ∆ln(market/book) from May-December 1999 
Large-firm dummy 0.2851*** 0.3954*** 0.4026** 0.3904** 0.3263*** 0.4266*** 0.4030** 0.3878* 0.2688 0.2721 
(2.63) (2.85) (2.20) (2.17) (2.68) (2.93) (2.01) (1.93) (1.25) (1.61) 
ln(assets)   -0.0849 0.0047 0.0007 0.0046 -0.0612 0.0150 0.0481 0.0994 
  (-0.84) (0.05) (0.03) (0.20) (-0.54) (0.13) (0.36) (1.53) 
           
∆(1st–6th powers of ln(assets)) N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
∆(Other control variables) N N N N N N N N Y Y 
Treatment group 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 2–8T 2–4T 
Control group 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T < 2T < 2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.25< 2T 0.25< 2T 
No. of large firms 42 25 42 25 42 25 42 25 42 25 
No. of control firms 100 100 100 100 492 492 100 100 155 155 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.21 
r (arge-firm dummy, ln(assets))   0.83 0.74 0.61 0.48 0.83 0.74 0.84 0.69 
  - 58 - 
Table 6 
Difference-in-differences:   market value of other Asian countries 
OLS regressions of ∆ln(Tobin’s q) [ln(Tobin’s q) in December 1999 minus ln(Tobin’s q) in June 1999] on large-firm 
dummy (=1 if assets > local currency equivalent of 2 trillion won at year-end 1998), constant, and other controls as shown 
for firms from six other Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand).  Exchange rate is 
measured at year-end 2008.  In each panel, regression (4) combines three countries severely affected by the 1997-1998 East 
Asian crisis (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand).  We combine these countries because each has only a few large firms.  
Sample excludes banks.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-Statistics, based on robust 
standard errors, are in parentheses.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. Panel A control group is mid-
sized firms (0.5 trillion won < assets < 2 trillion won); treatment group is large firms with assets from 2–8 trillion won.  
Panel B size range is 0.5–8 trillion won.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand All 6 countries 
      
Panel A: Independent variables – large-firm dummy, constant, country dummies as appropriate 
Large-firm dummy -0.0183 -0.0278 -0.0117 0.0006 -0.0122* 
(1.46) (1.15) (0.61) (0.40) (1.80) 
      
Country dummy N N N Y Y 
Treatment group 2–8T 2–8T 2–8T 2–8T 2–8T 
No. of large firms 53 33 26 38 150 
Control group 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 0.5–2T 
No. of control firms 83 46 80 131 340 
Adjusted R2 0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 0.01 
      
      
Panel B:  Replace large-firm dummy with ln(assets) 
ln(Assets) -0.0138 -0.0243 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0064 
 (1.37) (1.53) (0.13) (1.50) (1.50) 
      
Country dummy N N N Y Y 
Size range 0.5–8T 0.5–8T 0.5–8T 0.5–8T 0.5–8T 
Adjusted R2 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
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Table7 
Panel regressions for Board Structure Index 
Coefficients from regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on Board Structure Index, (KCGI – Board Structure Index – Ownership 
Parity), Ownership Parity Index, and control variables.  Regressions include all firms, except regression (5) is limited to 
small firms.  Outliers for each year are identified and dropped if the studentized residual from a regression of ln(Tobin’s q) 
on Board Structure Index is greater than ±1.96.  Fixed effects regressions omit ADR, MSCI index, and industry dummies 
due to minimal or no within-firm variation over time.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  All 
regressions use year dummies, unbalanced panels, and firm clusters. t- or z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  R2 is 
adjusted R2 for OLS, overall R2 for random effects, and within R2 for fixed effects regressions.  Significant results (at 5% 
level or better) are in boldface. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects (unbalanced) All Small
Board Structure Index 0.0124*** 0.0109*** 0.0101*** 0.0088***(6.87) (7.53) (6.58) (3.68)
KCGI – Board Structure Index – Ownership Parity 0.0025** 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010(2.31) (1.61) (1.09) (0.95)
Ownership Parity 0.0091*** 0.0038 0.0005 0.0000(3.77) (1.60) (0.17) (0.02)
ln(Assets) -0.0305*** -0.0394*** -0.0566*** -0.0688***(3.31) (4.29) (2.70) (-2.89)
ln(Years listed) -0.0520*** -0.0574*** -0.0974*** -0.1003***(5.24) (5.71) (2.86) (-2.69)
Leverage -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000(1.01) (2.35) (1.31) (-1.42)
Sales growth -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000(0.64) (0.31) (0.51) (-0.27)
R&D/Sales 0.0672*** 0.0224*** 0.0184*** 0.0182***(5.94) (4.03) (3.37) (3.33)
Advertising/Sales 1.2596*** 1.0291** 0.8610 0.9712(2.80) (2.04) (1.35) (1.41)
Exports/Sales -0.0050 -0.0335 -0.0745* -0.0711*(0.16) (1.20) (1.95) (-1.80)
PPE/Sales -0.0238 -0.0268* -0.0417** -0.0440*(1.42) (1.73) (1.98) (-1.85)
(PPE/Sales)2 0.0007 0.0005 0.0008 0.0009(1.20) (1.04) (1.28) (1.19)
Capex/PPE 0.1292*** 0.0698** 0.0541* 0.0653**(3.59) (2.55) (1.91) (2.06)
EBIT/Sales -0.0199*** -0.0153*** -0.0087** -0.0086**(2.86) (3.21) (2.19) (-2.14)
Market share 0.1322 0.2695*** 0.3072*** 0.1999*(1.59) (3.09) (2.70) (1.96)
Share turnover 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000(3.23) (1.04) (0.56) (0.63)
Foreign ownership 0.0022*** 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0028***(3.19) (3.87) (3.82) (3.27)
Sole ownership -0.0047*** -0.0030** -0.0014 -0.0017(3.56) (2.09) (0.76) (-0.84)
(Sole ownership)2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000(1.20) (0.14) (0.11) (0.04)
Chaebol dummy 0.0555*** 0.0439**  (3.05) (2.43)  
  
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
ADR, MSCI, 4-digit industry dummies yes yes no no
Observations (no. of firms) 3693 (656) 3693 (656) 3693 (656) 3305 (611)
Random effects λ 0.71  
R2 0.2832 0.2788 0.2201 0.2374
  
  - 60 - 
Table 8 
Panel regressions for Board Independence and Board Committee Subindices 
Coefficients from regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on Board Independence and Board Committees Subindices, board structure 
elements, indicated control for rest of KCGI, and other control variables as in Table 7.  Regressions include all firms, except 
regression (3) is limited to small firms.  Outliers for each year are identified and dropped if the studentized residual from a 
regression of the dependent variable on Board Structure Index (Panel A), Board Independence Subindex (Panel B), or Board 
Committee Subindex (Panel C) exceeds ±1.96.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  All 
regressions use year dummies, unbalanced panels, and firm clusters. t- or z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  R2 is 
overall R2 for random effects and within R2 for fixed effects.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Random effects Fixed effects (unbalanced) All Small 
  
Panel A  
Board Independence Subindex 0.0133*** 0.0122*** 0.0118***
(6.32) (5.48) (4.19) 
Board Committee Subindex 0.0079*** 0.0074** 0.0056 
(2.65) (2.48) (1.30) 
KCGI - Board Structure Index 0.0018** 0.0010 0.0009 
(2.28) (1.12) (0.94) 
R2 0.2771 0.2206 0.2380 
  
Panel B  
b1 (50% outside director dummy) 0.0864*** 0.0791*** 0.0717***
(5.39) (4.85) (2.84) 
b2 (> 50% outside director dummy) 0.0570*** 0.0588*** 0.0605* 
(2.73) (2.69) (1.69) 
KCGI - Board Independence Subindex 0.0021*** 0.0012 0.0009 
(2.82) (1.45) (0.91) 
R2 0.2742 0.2213 0.2374 
  
Panel C  
Nominating committee 0.0380** 0.0340* 0.0272 
(2.25) (1.95) (1.37) 
Audit committee 0.0437** 0.0439** 0.0298 
(2.13) (2.08) (1.11) 
Compensation committee 0.0431 0.0379 0.0271 
(1.09) (0.90) (0.59) 
KCGI - Board Committee Subindex 0.0027*** 0.0017** 0.0011 
(3.42) (1.99) (1.11) 
R2 0.2646 0.2087 0.2270 
  
All regressions  
Year dummies, other control variables yes yes yes 
Observations 3,708 3,708 3,305 
No. of firms 658 658 611 
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Table 9 
Two-stage least squares regressions 
Two-stage least squares regressions using large-firm IV (=1 if firm is large and year is 1999 or later, 0 otherwise) as an 
instrument for Board Structure Index, using pooled data from 1998-2004.  Both stages use firm fixed effects, year dummies, 
and other control variables as in Table 7.  Treatment of outliers is the same as in Table 7.  Model (A) controls for 
Ownership Parity and KCGI – Ownership Parity – Board Structure; model (B) omits these controls.  R2 is adjusted R2 for 
first stage and within R2 for second stage.  t-Statistics, with firm clusters, are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
 First Stage Second Stage 
Dependent variable Board Structure Index ln(Tobin’s q) 
Model (A) (B) (A) (B) 
Instrumented Board Structure Index   0.0144*** 0.0149*** 
  (3.15) (3.69) 
Ownership Parity 0.0307  0.0010  
(0.72)  (0.34)  
KCGI - Board Structure Index – Ownership Parity 0.0517***  0.0006  
(3.20)  (0.55)  
Large-firm IV 5.7742*** 6.1176***   
(8.48) (9.53)   
ln(Assets) -0.1896 -0.2419 -0.0593*** -0.0645*** 
(-0.48) (-0.63) (2.73) (-3.04) 
     
Year dummies, other control variables yes yes yes yes 
No. of observations 3,693 3732 3,693 3732 
No. of firms 656 656 656 656 
Within R2 0.3463 0.2061 0.3616 0.2008 
 
